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TAMING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
WITHOUT OVERRULING HANS V.

LoUISIANA
William Burnham*
Traditionaleleventh amendment jurisprudence has it that

in 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the
amendment, though its terms prohibit only suits against a state
by citizens of other states, applied to barfederal constitutional

claims as well. The Author argues that this is a flawed reading
of Hans because Hans did not involve a federal constitutional
claim. Instead, the plaintiff in Hans -assertedonly a common

law claim against the state - which claim the Court held was
barred by common law sovereign immunity. For this reason, the
author argues that neither Hans nor the eleventh amendment

need be read to barfederal claims against the states in federal
court.

THE YEAR 1990 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of one
of the Supreme Court of the United States' most important de-

cisions. Hans v. Louisiana' is said to stand for the proposition that
the eleventh amendment, despite its more narrow wording,' applies not only to bar claims in citizen-state diversity cases, but to
bar "even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts," 3 including claims seeking redress for
violations of federal constitutional rights. The difficulties Hans has
caused for those seeking redress for state violations of the Constitution are obvious. Consequently, a substantial number of com*

Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., B.S., Indiana University (Bloom-

ington) (1968); J.D., Indiana University (Bloomington) (1973).
1. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
2. The eleventh amendment provides that: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
3. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 n.30 (1984)
(citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (citing Hans v. Louisiana 134
U.S. 1 (1890))).
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mentators 4 and a growing number of justices of the Court' have
argued that Hans should be overruled on this issue. So far, how4. Two recent articles have debated the validity of the diversity theory of the eleventh amendment - which is one basis for attacking Hans. Compare Marshall, Fighting
the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989) (Professor Lawrence Marshall) [hereinafter Marshall, Fighting the Words] (arguing for a textual approach to the eleventh amendment where the amendment would only apply to diversity
cases) with Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1395-96 (1989) (Professor William Marshall) [hereinafter Marshall, Diversity Theory] (diversity theorists have not adequately rebutted the presumption in favor of stare decisis). The debate continues. See Fletcher, The Diversity
Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261
(1989); Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61 (1989); Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1990).
For other commentary criticizing the Hans court's interpretation of eleventh amendment immunity, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1972) (the eleventh amendment does not require state immunity from federal claims);
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1476 (1987) (calling the
Court's premise in Hans - that the eleventh amendment concerns sovereign immunity "clear error"); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs,
44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) ("the Court in Hans veered far from the course");
Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1039-41 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment] (state
immunity from federal claims in federal court is unworkable in a system that values civil
rights); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2000-01 (1983) (characterizing Hans as a judicial reaction to post-Reconstruction Southern bond defaults); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 44-51 (1988) (the
Hans court should have equalized in-stater's and out-of-stater's status in suits against
states by allowing both groups to bring federal claims); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984) (Hans was "an
unforced error . . . neither required nor fruitful").
For mild approval of Hans reading it as an interpretation of the contracts clause and
common law sovereign immunity, see Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 537, 541 (1978) [hereinafter
Field, Part 1]; and Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1265-66
(1978) [hereinafter Field, Part II].
5. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens are now on record as being in
favor of overruling Hans. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas State Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496-521 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the eleventh amendment applies only to citizen-state
diversity cases); and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (doctrine created by the traditional interpretation of Hans is
"pernicious").
The most recent defection to the anti-Hans camp was Justice Stevens. Compare Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Assoc., 450 U.S.
147, 151-55 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (declining to vote to overrule Hans -though
believing that it was incorrectly decided) with Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (the benefits of re-examining Hans would outweigh the consequences of departing from stare decisis).
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ever, the Court has declined to do so -

twice this past term.

Much of the reason for declining to overrule Hans has been a
fear that to reverse such a longstanding precedent would "further
unravel[] the doctrine of stare decisis.' '7 However, Hans, properly
understood, need not be overruled in order for the Court to allow
constitutional and other federal-law claims to be asserted against
the states in federal court. This Article asserts that Hans, properly

understood, cannot stand for the proposition that federal claims
are barred, because Hans neither involved a claim based on federal law, nor stated that federal claims were barred. The Court
understood the claim made in Hans to be nothing more than a

common-law contract claim and simply applied common-law sovereign immunity to bar that claim.' So understood, Hans is irrelevant to any claims for violations of constitutional rights.
I.

THE COMMON-LAW THEORY OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY AND HANS

Essential to the idea that the eleventh amendment renders
states immune from constitutional claims is the notion that it is a

6. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth,
109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
The Court was split four to four on the issue in Welch, with Justice Scalia declining to
take a position in that case. However, Justice Scalia weighed in on the side of not overruling Hans in Union Gas, though not without some misgivings. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2296-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also infra note 7.
The defection of Justice Stevens in Atascadero and Justice Scalia's equivocation in
Welch led many to believe that the demise of Hans was imminent. One commentator went
so far as to outline what life would be like after Hans. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 72104 (speculating on the type of federal claims which could be brought in the absence of
Hans).
7. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 450 U.S. at 151 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
When Justice Stevens changed his mind and joined the Brennan camp in Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 304, he did so because it had become clear to him that the defenders of stare
decisis (versus overruling Hans) had no problem departing from that principle to expand
eleventh amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 165 & n.50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing "at least 28 cases" the Court had
rejected to widen the scope of the eleventh amendment).
Justice Scalia, while recently stating that Hans should not be overruled, did express
some doubt as to the correctness of some of the assumptions made with regard to history
and federalism which underlay this conclusion. Nonetheless, he believed that it was enough
that the question "is at least close," since the added weight of stare decisis militated
against the invitation to overrule a century-old precedent. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 229899 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 34-125.
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constitutionally-based jurisdictional bar to suit.9 Difficulties with
this theory have led Professor Field and others to search for a
better explanation. Though they differ in some respects on the
particulars, these commentators have concluded that the eleventh
amendment does not establish or affirm an immunity of constitutional proportions, but simply resurrects common-law sovereign
immunity.' 0 This insight is important because if the immunity in-

9. Even assuming that Hans held that federal claims were barred, it did not hold
that it was the eleventh amendment which barred the claim in that case. See id. at 10
(discussed infra text at note 94). It would be more accurate to characterize Hans as holding that the eleventh amendment bars only citizen-state diversity cases covered by its
terms, and as holding that there is some underlying constitutionally-based sovereign immunity of states (of which the eleventh amendment is only an example) that operates to bar
other claims, such as constitutional claims brought by citizens of the same state. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 71 n.56 (noting claims of Justice Brennan, among others, that Hans
did not constitutionalize sovereign immunity).
Nonetheless, it is common practice for the Court and others to say that in Hans "the
Court held that the [eleventh] [a]mendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against
his own state in federal court, even though the express terms of the [a]mendment do not so
provide." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
10. See Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White
Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1967) (arguing that the eleventh
amendment was merely intended to reinstate the common law immunity that existed before
Chisholm); Field, Part I, supra note 4, at 536-46 (the best explanation of sovereign immunity within and outside the eleventh amendment is that it is a common law doctrine);
Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at 1069-71 (eleventh amendment simply affirms the traditional common law principle of immunity from suit under the own state's
law); see also Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Hans accords to non/ consenting states only a nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its own citizens"); Cf.
Amar, supra note 4, at 1473-75 (eleventh amendment does not create a constitutionallybased sovereign immunity).
Among the characteristics of eleventh amendment immunity that do not fit well with a
constitutional prohibition are the fact that a state may consent to suit and the fact that the
prohibition is read to apply to suits by citizens against their own state. See Field, Part I,
supra note 4, at 544 ("the omission of suits by a state's own citizens from the language of
the eleventh amendment makes sense under [the common law] interpretation").
Another phenomenon that is hard to explain is the fact that Congress apparently has
the power to abrogate the constitutional prohibition by statute, at least so long as it makes
clear its intent to do so. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (Congress can abrogate the
eleventh amendment when acting pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment); cf.
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing puzzlement over how
Congress could override a constitutional limitation on jurisdiction by statute). This intent
can be expressed either in the statutory language, whether through authorization of a claim
against the states as states, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (section 5
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act authorized actions for back pay against the states), or
through other language directly expressing such intent, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) ("a state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment...
from suit in [faederal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act"), or it
may even be clearly expressed in the legislative history of the statute. See Hutto v. Finney,
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volved has only common-law status, then it should bar claims
seeking to enforce common-law duties, but should not bar federal
statutory or constitutional claims."
This common-law immunity theory of the eleventh amendment is based on the debates regarding the ratification of article
III of the Constitution and a close reading of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia.2 According to this
view, the framers debated whether article III's grant of jurisdiction over categories of cases in which a state was a party operated
to abolish any sovereign immunity the states had at common law.
Some argued that abolition was necessarily implied, while others
saw article III as establishing jurisdiction, but not affecting the
issue of sovereign immunity.' 3 In Chisholm, the majority construed article III as abolishing sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment was passed and ratified to correct that reading of
4
article III.1

437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is clear that attorney
fees are meant to be assessed against states). But see Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397,
2401 (1989) (discounting the role of legislative history).
Other counterintuitive oddities of eleventh amendment law are collected by Justice
Stevens in his Union Gas concurrence. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287-88 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
11. There are two reasons that a common-law immunity would not bar federal constitutional and statutory claims. The first is the fact that federal law prevails over all other
forms of law. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; . . . any . . . Laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding."). The second is the axiom that common-law doctrines are subject to legislative change, including change wrought by constitutions. See also Jackson,
supra note 4, at 78-82, 114-18 (supremacy of constitutional law requires that common-law
sovereign immunity give way in the face of a federal constitutional claim); cf. Field, Part
II, supra note 4, at 1264 n.272 (suggesting that even if the eleventh amendment "freezes"
common-law sovereign immunity in its 1789 form, such immunity would extend only to
common-law claims).
12. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
Chisholm arose when Georgia failed to pay for supplies that a South Carolina
merchant had provided during the Revolutionary War under a contract with the state. The
merchant had died, so it was his executor, Chisholm, who sued in assumpsii to recover on
the contract. The action was an original one in the Supreme Court of the United States
and it was argued for Chisholm by the United States Attorney General, John Randolph.
Georgia declined to argue in response and simply entered a written objection to jurisdiction. See Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at 1054-58.
For an in-depth historical account of Chisholm, see C. JACOBS, supra note 4, at 46-67;
and Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. AM. HIsT. 19, 20-29
(1967).
13. See Field, PartI, supra note 4, at 527-36; Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 4, at 1045-54.
14. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890).
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According to the common law immunity theorists, the sin of
the Chisholm majority was that it incorrectly mixed two questions: (1) whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
the case under article III and its implementing statutes, and (2)
whether an assumpsit cause of action for the state's breach of contract existed in the face of Georgia's defense of sovereign immunity.' 5 Instead, in one step the majority found jurisdiction in article III and construed the grant thereof to abolish Georgia's
common law sovereign immunity - which would have normally
barred an assumpsit claim against it. 6 The Chisholm Court
should have separated the issues and decided that it had jurisdiction under article III, but that such a grant of jurisdiction did
nothing to affect the law to be applied in the case. 7 The substantative law, which governed both the plaintiff's claim and
Georgia's defense, was the general common law, which provided
that an assumpsit claim would not lie against a state in the absence of its consent to suit.' 8
This was Justice Iredell's argument in dissent. 9 The eleventh

15. Professor Amar has referred to these two questions as the jurisdictional issue and
the rule of decision issue, respectively. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1467.
16. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Justice Iredell concluded that article III should be construed as merely bestowing
jurisdiction and that the law governing whether a claim could be stated in "controversies in
which a State can be a party . . . can be determined . . . in no other manner than by a
reference . . . to pre-existent laws." 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 436 (Iredell, J., dissenting). He
found support for this conclusion in the fact that article III provided for jurisdiction over
controversies - the substance of which federal authority could not control without violating the reserved powers of the states, id. at 435-36, and in section 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which limited the power of the federal courts to remedies that were "agreeable to
the principles and usages of law." Id. at 434 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Justice Iredell also found it significant that the Court's jurisdiction was concurrent
with that of state courts, in which the common law would be the rule of decision, and he
observed that the Court "c[ould] exercise no authority in the present instance . . . but
such as a proper State Court would have been at least competent to exercise at the time
[that] the [Judiciary Act] was passed." Id. at 436-37 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Though he
believed that "[tihe principles of law to which reference is to be had" were either "the
particular laws of the State against which the suit is brought [or "the] [p]rinciples of law
common to all the [s]tates," id. at 434 (Iredell, J., dissenting), it made no difference in the
result, since "neither in the State now in question, nor in any other in the Union, [is there]
any particular Legislative mode, authorizing a compulsory suit for the recovery of money
against a State." Id. (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). He concluded that
there are no principles of the old [common] law, to which [the Court] must have
recourse, that in any manner authorize the present suit, either by precedent or
by analogy. The consequence of which . . . clearly is, that the suit in question
cannot be maintained, nor, of course, the motion made upon it be complied with.
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amendment adopted Justice Iredell's position: The eleventh

amendment made it clear that, while article III might properly
authorize subject mattei" jurisdiction over some suits against the
states, "[t]he [j]udicial power of the United States shall not be
construed" 2 0 to authorize the Court to change the common law or

to ignore common law sovereign immunity when handling those
suits. The eleventh amendment, then, by restoring article III to its

proper position of neutrality with regard to the common law, had
the effect of restoring to the states the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit."
This view of Chisholm and the eleventh amendment is supported by the fact that Justice Iredell admitted that his resolution

of the case had nothing to do with the possibility of suing states
based on federal constitutional claims.22 By contrast, the argument made by Attorney General Randolph, Chisholm's lawyer,
explicitly relied on the premise that there were limitations placed
upon state action in the Constitution, some of which must contemplate suits against states if they were to have any meaning at all.2 3

Because states must be subject to suit in those instances, Attorney
General Randolph argued, there was no reason to treat assumpsit
claims differently.2 4 It is significant that Justice Iredell did not
deny Attorney General Randolph's basic premise that states were

subject to suit for constitutional violations; he simply separated it

Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
21. See Field, Part I, supra note 4, at 536-44 (arguing that the view advocated by
Madison, Marshall and Hamilton - that article III had no effect on common law immunity - was vindicated by the passage of the eleventh amendment).
The common law sovereign immunity proponents follow the notion that, consistent
with the intent of its framers, the eleventh amendment should be interpreted as overruling
the majority holding in Chisholm and enshrining Justice Iredell's dissenting position in that
case. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (after adoption of the eleventh amendment, "the highest authority of this country was in accord rather with the minority than
with the majority of the court in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and this fact lends
additional interest to the able opinion of . . . Justice Iredell on that occasion."); see also
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 807 (tentative ed. 1958) (The Court has "treat[ed] the eleventh amendment as if it were a precedent to the opposite of Chisholm v. Georgia.").
22. He explained that, in this regard, the common law did not apply "[s]o far as
States under the Constitution can be made legally liable to [superior federal] authority."
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 436 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 421-23 (argument of Randolph for the Plaintiff).
24. Id. at 428 (argument of Randolph for the Plaintiff) (admitting "it does not follow from a State being suable in some actions, that she is liable in every action. But that of
assumpsit is of all others most free from cavil.").
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from the issue at hand.25 He regarded it as one of the "arguments

offered by the Attorney General, which certainly w[as] very
proper, as to his extended view of the case, but [which] do[es] not
affect mine."' 26 Justice Iredell could only have said this if his position was nothing more than that stated above - that the common
law failed to provide an assumpsit cause of action against a state
and that article III was no basis for expanding the common law to

create such a remedy.27
If it is true that the eleventh amendment simply amends article III to return it to its original position of neutrality with regard
to common-law sovereign immunity, then it should bar commonlaw claims, but not federal law claims.2" However, for those who
25. "The particular question then before the Court, [wals, will an action of assumpsit lie against a State? This particular question [must be] abstracted from the general one,
viz. Whether, a State can in any instance be sued?" Id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
27. Justice Iredell ultimately expressed his views on the suability of states on constitutional claims, and he described it as a "delicate topic," while making it clear that his
views were strictly dictum. Id. at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting) In addition to stating that the
issue was "unnecessary ...
to decide," id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting), he observed:
This opinion I hold . . . with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to
my sentiments in this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial. With
regard to the policy of maintaining such suits [on federal constitutional claims],
that is not for this Court to consider, unless the point in all other respects was
very doubtful.
Id. at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting). On the merits of the issue, his view was that states could
not be sued unless Congress created a right to sue them: "[E]ven if the Constitution would
admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is necessary for the purpose, since no part
of the existing law applies." Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Without that legislative
boost, Justice Iredell was "strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which
[would] admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery
of money." Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
Justice Iredell's views correspond roughly with the Court's current view of congressional power to abrogate such immunity - except for the Court's additional requirement
that there be some "super-intent" accompanying the legislation. See supra note 10.
28. See supra note 11.
An advantage of the common law theory of the eleventh amendment is its ability to
differentiate between claims based on whether they are federal or state claims. This avoids
the problem which the diversity theorists have: they insist on applying the literal words of
the amendment, but have trouble explaining why it still makes sense that the eleventh
amendment would bar federal law claims if they happened to be asserted against a state by
a citizen of another state. See Marshall, Diversity Theory, supra note 4, at 1378 (an evaluation of diversity theory shows "there is no persuasive reason why suits based on federal
law should be allowed in federal court when brought by an in-stater, but should not be
allowed in federal court when brought by an out-stater"). But cf. Marshall, Fighting the
Words, supra note 4, at 1345 (offering a number of justifications for distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state citizens "by considering the dual objectives of removing the
jurisdiction that must have offended and threatened the states, while preserving the jurisdiction considered most essential to the constitutional system of government").
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would follow the common law status of eleventh amendment immunity this far, Hans presents a problem. 2 This is because it is
said that Hans, unlike Chisholm, did involve a federal constitutional claim under the contracts clause.30
In response to this traditional reading of Hans, some proponents of the common-law status of sovereign immunity retreat to a
fall-back position. They assert that, while the common-law sovereign immunity resurrected by the eleventh amendment prevents
the federal courts from implying a right of action contrary to
common law sovereign immunity as it existed before article III
was ratified,31 Congress is under no such disability in legislating
such claims into existence. 2 Other proponents of the common law
sovereign immunity theory of the eleventh amendment similarly
accept that Hans involved a constitutional claim, but argue simply
33
that it was wrongly decided.
The common law immunity theorists have a similar problem in that they, like the
current Court, are necessarily arguing that the immunity which the eleventh amendment
secures goes beyond that amendment's wording when they argue that all common lawbased claims are barred - even if they are properly a part of a suit against a state based
on federal question jurisdiction.
29. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued the state in federal court to recover interest
due on his bonds, and he alleged in the process that the state refused to pay based on its
constitution's provisions abrogating all previous bond issues, and that that provision violated the contracts clause. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890).
30. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1476-78; Field, Part I!, supra note 4, at 1255;
Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at 1122-24.
For the text of the contracts clause, see infra note 39.
In Chisholm, Attorney General Randolph alluded obliquely to the possibility that
state contracts came within the contracts clause, see Chisholm v. Georgia; 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419, 422 (1793), thus perhaps presaging a somewhat surprising decision 17 years later. See
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (contracts clause prohibited Georgia
from passing a law which would void a grant of land from the state). However, he did not
allege, nor could he have alleged, that Georgia had legislatively impaired its contracts,
since all that was involved was a simple breach of contract. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at
1055 n.97 (Attorney General Randolph did not treat Chisholm as a contracts clause case
and the Court probably would not have found a violation of the contracts clause, even
though at that time, it was not clear whether a breach of contract would come under that
clause).
31. That is, courts may not "construe[]" the "judicial power" to authorize such a
claim. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
32. See Nowak, supra note 4, at 1422 (eleventh amendment does not "necessarily
limit congressional power . . . to the same extent as . . . judicial power."); Tribe, supra
note 10, at 693-94 (impact of the eleventh amendment on judicial power must be distinguished from its impact on congressional power). But see Field, Part II, supra note 4, at
1260 (there is "nothing in either the language or history of the amendment that affirmatively supports or even suggests" that the eleventh amendment does not constrict congressional power).
33. See Engdahl, supra note 4, at 31; Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4,
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This Article asserts that both groups have uncritically accepted Hans for much more than it is worth. This Article argues
that Hans, like Chisholm, was properly decided, but that Hans
did not hold that sovereign immunity or the eleventh amendment
operated to bar a federal constitutional claim, because Hans asserted no such constitutional claim. Rather, Hans asserted a common law claim to enforce his contract with the state - the identical assumpsit cause of action that was involved in Chisholm.
Consequently, Hans' claim failed for the very same reason that
Justice Iredell gave in his Chisholm dissent: applying the appropriate common law rule of decision, there was no basis for a federal court to entertain an assumpsit cause of action against a state
in the face of common law sovereign immunity.3 4 So understood,
the Hans holding is irrelevant to the question of whether a federal
constitutional claim should be barred by the eleventh amendment.
Moreover, the Hans opinion implied in dictum that, had a constitutional claim been asserted, there would have been no sovereign
immunity shield,"6

at 1080-81.
This is also Justice Brennan's primary position on Hans. See supra note 5.
34. Federal courts at that time would have applied the general common law despite
the Rules of Decision Act. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) (state law shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law). See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842). It was not
until 1938 that the Court held that there was no "federal general common law" and that
the Rules of Decision Act required that federal courts follow state decisional as well as
statutory law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 68, 78 (1938). Instead, federal courts
would have followed the general common law because it was deemed the applicable rule of
decision without any need for statutory direction. See generally P. DUPONCEAU, DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED

STATES 101 (1824 & photo. reprint 1972) (federal courts "are bound to take the common

law as their rule of decision whenever other laws, national or local, are not applicable.");
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1513, 1516-27 (1984) [hereinafter
Fletcher, The General Common Law] (where "local law" did not apply, it was widely
understood that federal courts were to disdain state common law in favor of general com-

mon law; thus, Swift was merely the judicial recognition of what was generally thought to
be so obvious).

35. Justice Brennan suggested a similar theory of Hans in dictum in his majority
opinion in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1964) (distinguishing Hans on
the ground that it dealt with a state rather than a federal law claim), overruled, Welch v.

Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), in his dissent in Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 313, 319 n.7 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Hans held that the Eleventh
Amendment was inapplicable [in a suit against a state by its own citizens] . . .but that

the state nevertheless enjoyed the protection of the ancient doctrine, inherent in the nature
of sovereignty, that a state is not amenable to the suit of an individual without its con-
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HANS REEXAMINED: A COMMON LAW ASSUMPSIT CLAIM
MET By COMMON LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The evidence that Hans involved only a common law claim is
found in what the Court said and what it did not say in Hans
itself. This theory also finds support in the Court's overall understanding of the nature of the claims being asserted against the
states in the "Bond Wars" following the Civil War, as reflected in
other cases. 6
A. Judicial Characterizations of State Bondholder Suits at the
Time of Hans
As for what the Court did not say in Hans, foremost is the
fact that it never characterized Hans' claim as a federal constitutional one. In his petition, Hans first alleged that he had a bond
contract, that he was in possession of coupons representing interest on those bonds, and that, "notwithstanding said solemn compact with the holders of said bonds, said State hath refused and
still refuses to pay said coupons held by petitioner. ' 37 The petition
further alleged that the "provisions of [the Louisiana Constitution
abrogating the bonds were] in contravention of said contract, and
their adoption was an active violation thereof, and that said State
thereby sought to impair the validity thereof with [Hans] in violation of [the contracts clause]. ' 3a
The petition is ambiguous and it is perhaps difficult today to

understand why Hans' claim was not one for violation of a right
sent."), and again in his dissent in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 299300 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the claim at issue in Hans was dismissed for failure
to state a federal cause of action). Justice Brennan has left the exact scope of the theory
largely undeveloped, perhaps because he sees overruling Hans as the best solution to the
problem of federal claims being barred by the eleventh amendment.
36. For accounts of the Bond Wars, see generally McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S.
662, 665-83 (1890) (outlining the history of Virginia's bonds and its efforts to evade payment on them); and Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1973-2003 (to avoid repudiation of its judgments by state governments engaged in the "Bond Wars," the federal courts constitutionalized sovereign immunity).
As these sources illustrate, the Court was under considerable political pressure, because it was likely that the states would defy any decision by the Court upholding the
validity of state bonds. Perhaps as a result of this, the Court's decisions in this period are
contradictory and difficult to harmonize. See McGahey, 135 U.S. at 684 (Court arrived at
its conclusions in this case "[w]ithout committing . . . to all that has been said, or even all
that may have been adjudged, in the preceding cases that have come before the [C]ourt on
the subject").
37. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (quoting petition).
38. Id. at 2 (quoting petition).
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secured by the Constitution. To understand, one must look at the
claim with then-contemporary eyes. Such a view reveals that

Hans' claim could only have been seen as one for a common-law
breach of contract, which Hans anticipated would be met with the

defense of the state constitutional provision, to which he had the
rejoinder that that defense was invalid under the contracts
clause."9

Support for this proposition can be found in the holding of
Carterv. Greenhow,40 decided just five years before Hans, where a

state bondholder tried to assert a constitutional claim under the
contracts clause and was rebuffed. Carter, a Virginia citizen, held

bonds issued by the state of Virginia. The bonds provided that
they could be redeemed for cash or used to pay state taxes. 41 The

defendant, a state tax collector, acting pursuant to a statute altering the terms of the bonds, refused to accept Carter's bond cou-

pons in payment of state taxes and seized his property for nonpayment. In response, Carter filed suit relying on section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983),42 alleging that
the Virginia statutes altering the terms of the bonds were "repug-

nant to the constitution of the United States, and are therefore
void" such that, in collecting taxes pursuant to those statutes "the
defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured to him by the

39. The contracts clause provides that: "[n]o State shall ... pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
Originally, this clause had the narrow purpose of nullifying state laws relieving private
debtors of their obligations on loans - thus stabilizing credit markets and spurring foreign
investment. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 372, 373
(3d ed. 1986). However, despite this narrow purpose, the Court extended it to govern contracts to which states were parties. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
One could argue that Hans' claim must have been a federal one, because the only
basis for jurisdiction would have been that the case arose under federal law; however, this
is not true. See infra notes 61-95 and accompanying text.
40. 114 U.S. 317 (1885).
41. Id. at 318-19.
42. This statute provided at the time:
Any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any
such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
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constitution of the United States . . .,.
The Court characterized the constitutional rights that the
plaintiff alleged were violated as "the right to pay taxes in coupons instead of money, and, after, tender of coupons, the immunity from further proceeding to collect such taxes as though they
were delinquent." ' 4 4 The Court disagreed that these were federal
constitutional rights, stating that:
[t]hese rights the plaintiff derives from the contract with the
State, . . . and the bonds and coupons issued under its
authority.
How and in what sense are these rights secured to him by
the Constitution of the United States? The answer is, by that
provision, Art. I., Sec. 10, which forbids any State to pass laws
impairing the obligation of contracts. That constitutional provision, so far as it can be said to confer upon, or secure to, any
person, any individual rights, does so indirectly and incidentally.
It forbids the passage by the States of laws such as are described. If any such are nevertheless passed by the legislature of
a State, they are unconstitutional, null and void. In any judicial
proceeding necessary to vindicate his rights under a contract,
affected by such legislation, the individual has a right to have a
judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to
impair its obligation. This is the only right secured to him by
that clause of the Constitution. . . .The right to pay his taxes
in coupons, and the immunity from further proceedings, in case
of a rejected tender, are not rights directly secured to him by
the Constitution, and only so indirectly as they happen in this
case to be the rights of contract which he holds under the laws
of Virginia. And the only mode in which that constitutional security takes effect is by judicial process to invalidate the unconstitutional legislation of the State, when it is 45
set up against the
enforcement of his rights under his contract.

43.
44.
45.

Carter, 114 U.S. at 321 (quoting plaintiff's declaration).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322 (emphasis added).

The Court went on to note that the only
mode in which Congress has legislated in aid of the rights secured by [the contracts] clause of the Constitution, is . . . by providing for a review on writ of

error to the judgments of the State courts, in cases where they have failed properly to give it effect, and by conferring jurisdiction upon the [federal] Circuit

Courts ...of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, where the sum or value in dispute exceeds $500. Congress has provided
no other remedy for the enforcement of this right.
Id. at 322-23 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12-13 (1885)).
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Noting that Carter had "chosen not to resort to" a direct suit on

the contract," the Court felt compelled to dismiss the complaint
because "the facts stated in the plaintiff's declaration [did not]
constitute a cause of action [for a violation of the contracts

clause] within the terms of" the Civil Rights Act of 1871.41

Carter was one of several of the Virginia Coupon Cases that
the Court decided together. Justice Bradley, the author of Hans,
did not write the Carter opinion. However, he dissented along

with three other justices in Marye v. Parsons," in an opinion
which was applicable to Carter and the other Virginia Coupon
Cases.49 The majority had allowed bondholders to sue the state in

46. Id. at 322.
Had Carter resorted to such a suit, he would have had to have filed it in state court,
since he lacked the $500 in controversy then needed for federal jurisdiction. Act of March
3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, repealed in part by Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1168 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)); 114 U.S. at 320 (alleging damage to
the plaintiff of $200). The other requirement for federal jurisdiction, however, would have
been met. Though Carter was a citizen of Virginia, his non-federal common law claim to
enforce the contract would have "arisen under" the contracts clause so long as he anticipated and pled a contracts clause rejoinder to the state's defense in his complaint. See infra
notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
47. Carter, 114 U.S. at 321; see also Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323 (1885)
(decided with, and on authority of, Carter, where the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to sue
for an injunction restraining the tax collector from collecting taxes by distraint of his property). The Court, in In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), cited in Hans, reiterated that
Carterstood for the proposition that "no direct action for the denial of the right secured by
a contract . . . would lie." Id. at 504.
The holding in Carter became garbled in Hague v. Committee For Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The Court observed that Carter "held as a matter of pleading
that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff's pleading was in contract and was
not to redress deprivation of the 'right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution'
[the contracts clause], to which he had 'chosen not to resort.'" Id. at 527 (quoting Carter
v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885)); cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 542 n.6 (1972) (the Court viewed Carter as "consistent with congressional restriction
of federal jurisdiction" in cases involving "constitutional challenges to the collection of
state taxes.").
In Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Protecting the
Right To Be Free of ProtectionistState Action, 86 MICH. L. REV. 157 (1987), the author
argued that Carter was wrongly decided because "it fail[ed] to distinguish the contracts
clause from any other constitutional provision." Id. at 178. However, there are plenty of
reasons to view the contracts clause as operating differently from other constitutional provisions. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. The point here, of course, is not
whether Carter was correct, but whether the way the Court viewed bondholders' claims in
Carter was the way the Court viewed them five years later in Hans.
48. 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 330-338 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Carterand Marye were two of the eight Virginia Coupon Cases decided as a group by
the Court. The Court dismissed these two cases, as well as the suits in Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323 (1885), and Moore v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 338 (1885). Justice Brad-
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one of the cases and Justice Bradley believed that all of the claims
in the cases before the Court should have been dismissed on eleventh amendment grounds.". However, Justice Bradley's dissent in
Marye agreed with the majority's analysis in Carter:
Now, what is the object of all this litigation which fills our
courts in reference to the Virginia bonds and coupons, but an
attempt, through the medium of the federal courts, to coerce the
State of Virginia into a fulfillment of her contract? . . . . Injunctions are sought, mandamuses are sought, damages are
sought, for the sole purpose of enforcing a specific performance
of the engagement made by the State . . .to receive the coupons of its bonds issued . . . in payment of taxes and other dues
to the State. . . .[The tax-payer .plaintiff] stands on the agreement and seeks to enforce it. All suits undertaken for this end
are, in truth and reality, suits against the State, to compel a
compliance with its agreement.51
Under this view, then, the Court understood claims made by
state bondholders, such as Hans, to be common-law claims to enforce the contract. The contracts clause would only arise by way
of the plaintiff anticipating the state's defense that it had repudiated its bonds. The plaintiff would not be able to recover, however,
because the common law applicable to the claim would include
sovereign immunity, which would render the normal common law
of contract obligations and remedies inapplicable when the state
was the defendant. 2 The plaintiff would lose because, in the

ley's position in all of these cases was that the eleventh amendment barred such suits. See,
e.g., Marye, 114 U.S. at 331 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
50. Marye, 114 U.S. at 331 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 332-33 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886) ("[t]hese suits are accurately described as bills for the
specific performance of a contract between the complainants and the State of South Carolina, who are the only parties to it").
Hagood was cited in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), as support for the
proposition that a state cannot be sued by a citizen of another state merely on the ground
that the case arises under the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
52. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16. Today, after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), the claim would be governed by state common law. That would not have been the
understanding of the Court in 1890, when the Court was still operating under the regime of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Then, assumpsit claims would have been
thought of as claims authorized by the general common law, whose source was more transcendental than the mere authority of a state.
It does not matter here whether it was state or general common law that applied to
the claims of Hans and the other bondholders. Only two characteristics of whichever common law of contracts federal courts applied are important; and both characteristics are as
important to the state common law in the post-1938 era as they were to the general com-
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words of Hans, "[t]he suability of a State without its consent was
a thing unknown to the [general common] law."
B. Support from the Structure of the Contracts Clause
This reasoning may seem rather quaint today in an age of

broadly construed constitutional rights and even broader remedies
for their violation,53 but it finds justification in the unique nature
of the contracts clause as a constitutional prohibition against impairing an obligation secured by an independent non-constitutional source of law. The contracts clause prohibits interference

with a common law obligation

it does not compel performance

-

of that obligation.5 4 Though a court would generally be empow-

ered to order contract performance if the impairing law was void,
it could do so only if the common law applicable to the obligation
required such performance. 55
Support for this view of the contracts clause can be garnered
from the fact that it tracks precisely the way the constitutional
mon law applied in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first was that the federal
courts were required to apply the common law when applicable, at least when state and
federal courts agreed on its content and applicability. See supra note 34. The proposition
that states could not be sued on their contracts without their consent was a common law
doctrine about which there was no disagreement. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711,
720 (1882) ("[n]either was there when the bonds were issued, nor is there now, any statute
or judicial decision giving the bondholders a remedy in the State courts or elsewhere");
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 434 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (concluding
that neither the law of Georgia nor the general common law "authoriz[ed] a compulsory
suit for recovery of money against a state"). The second characteristic was that the law to
be applied was non-federal, unwritten common law. This would necessarily mean that it
must, under the supremacy clause, give way to contrary federal law when there was a
direct conflict, and that it was subject to revision through statutory and constitutional measures. See supra note 11.
53. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (eighth amendment violation in
prison case remedied by remedial order setting such particulars as cell size, sanitation standards, and ratio of guards to inmates); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (equal
protection clause violation remedied by broad order requiring student busing and compensatory education programs); cf. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975) (suggesting that certain of the Court's remedial doctrines, which

are not directly compelled by the Constitution, could be thought of as "constitutional common law").
54.

"No State shall ...

pass any

. .

.Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl.
1.
55. Federal courts are authorized to decide state law or general common law issues
that come before them in the course of any case over which they otherwise have jurisdiction. Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) (federal courts can
base their decision solely on state or local law -

once federal question jurisdiction is estab-

lished); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820-23 (1824)
(Congress has the power to create federal jurisdiction for pendent state law claims).
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issue would arise in litigation involving contracts between private
parties, which were the original focus of the contracts clause.56
One would certainly not say that a creditor's suit against a private
debtor is an implied right of action under the contracts clause. For
example, assume that a state passed a law retroactively voiding all
loan contracts charging more than six percent interest, and a private debtor whose loan contract charged a higher rate refused to
pay back a loan on that basis. 51 In the normal course of events,
the creditor would sue the debtor on the contract in order to collect the debt, the debtor would then interpose the retroactive
usury statute as a defense, and the creditor would respond with
the contracts clause to invalidate that defense. But even if the
creditor could strip the debtor of this defense with a contracts
clause rejoinder, the creditor's success would still depend on
whether the creditor could recover on the contract as a matter of
the common law. If the creditor's cause of action failed because of
some problem other than the retroactive usury law,58 then the
creditor would lose for that independent reason. Thus, there are
double pitfalls to the creditor's recovery against the private
debtor. The creditor must show (1) that the retroactive usury defense does not relieve the debtor of its obligation, and (2) that the
contract, as unimpaired, is otherwise enforceable according to the
existing common law of contracts.
The Court in Carter referred to this double burden when it
said that the contracts clause did not secure the contract rights
the plaintiff sought to enforce.5 9 The contracts clause operates in
all circumstances to void any state law that impairs contract obligations, but it does not constitutionalize such obligations; they
draw any legal force they may have from the common law, which
may itself pose obstacles to recovery. Where the state is the
debtor and party defendant, the common law poses an insurmountable obstacle to recovery because, regardless of what obligations the state has assumed, the common law provides that the

56. See supra note 39.
57. This example is taken from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 207,(1819), wherein the Court finally put the
contracts clause to its intended use: nullifying state laws relieving debtors of their obligations on loans. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
58. For example, these reasons could include nonperformance by the creditor, pay-

ment not due, statute of, limitations, or failure to make proper demand for payment.
59.

note 45.

Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885); see supra text accompanying
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state may not be sued without its consent."0

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Hans
In order to shed additional light on the precise nature of state
bondholder claims, it is helpful to explore the subject matter jurisdictional basis for citizens like Hans asserting common law contract claims against their own states in federal court. Because diversity was absent, jurisdiction would have existed only if those
cases were ones "arising under" federal law.6 - Understanding this
jurisdictional issue is important because the principal reason virtually everyone today assumes that Hans asserted a constitutional
claim is the fact that the only basis for jurisdiction of that nondiverse suit would have been federal question jurisdiction. In fact,
this assumption is incorrect.6 2
The Hans Court did not say exactly how and where the fed-

60. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890); see supra text accompanying note 52.
One might assert that, even if a suit for coercive relief could only be based on common
law contract rights, the plaintiff could turn a defensive rejoinder into a constitutional claim
by seeking a declaratory judgment that the state's law impairing the contract was invalid.
However, this would not have been possible under notiorts of justiciability and standing
prevailing in the nineteenth century. Not only was there no provision for declaratory relief,
the Court declined in a similar situation to hold the state's impairing law void. See Marye
v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325 (1885). In Marye, holders of state bonds, who wished to sell
them, sought a judgment that the Virginia law revoking the right to use coupons to pay
taxes was void, claiming that the law impaired the value of the bonds. The Court dismissed
the claim on the ground that it "call[ed] for a declaration of an abstract character." Id. at
329.
61. At the time of Hans, "arising under," or federal question jurisdiction, would
have been provided by the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, amended by Act of
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat.
433 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-31 (1982)). But cf. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1819 (holding that the Court lacked federal question jurisdiction). The jurisdictional issue in
Hans is discussed infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
62. Justice Brennan suggested in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186-87
(1964), that Hans had made only a common law contract claim. He was taken to task on
this point by Professor Field, on the ground that the fact of federal question jurisdiction
necessarily meant that Hans had made a federal claim. See Field, Part II, supra note 4, at
1254-56 (asserting that Hans involved a federal constitutional claim to enforce the contracts clause); and infra text accompanying notes 155-57 (criticizing Professor Field's
reasoning).
Most other commentators have simply assumed that Hans' claim was constitutional.
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 4, at 1476; Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at
1122-23.
One commentator has argued that Hans is all dictum, because the Court should have
dismissed Hans' claim for lack of either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. See McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REv.
485, 506-07 (1973).
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eral question arose in that case. 3 The Court did say, with reference to Hans' claim, that "a case is within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, without regard to the character of the parties, if it
arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or,
which is the same thing, if it necessarily involves a question under
said Constitution or laws."'64 This statement is ambiguous because
it could well include cases raising the contracts clause issue in the
way that Carter suggested - as a rejoinder to a defense which
the state was certain to raise. Placed in the context of the then-

prevailing views on the nature of federal question jurisdiction, this
is most likely what the Hans Court had in mind.
Hans was decided some eighteen years before the well-

pleaded complaint rule articulated by Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley. 65 Mottley held that a case does not arise under federal

law when the plaintiff presents solely a state law claim and "alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts
that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. 6 Before Mottley, however, cases of
this description regularly qualified as ones "arising under" federal
67
law.

63. See supra text accompanying note 37.
64. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890).
65. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
In Mottley, the plaintiffs anticipated both a federal defense and a federal rejoinder to
that defense. The Mottleys' claim was that they were entitled to perpetual free passage on
the defendant railroad because they had a pass to that effect, which the railroad had given
them in partial settlement of claims they had asserted against the railroad. The railroad
defended that the pass was void because a recent federal statute outlawed them, and the
plaintiffs' rejoinder was that the federal statute violated the due process clause. Id. at 15051. According to the Court, however, only if the basis of the plaintiffs' claim was federal
law did the case qualify as one arising under federal law. Id. at 152. Mottley presented a
common-law contract claim, to which it was expected that a federal statutory defense
would be asserted, and to which it was expected that there would be a constitutional rejoinder by the plaintiffs. But this was held insufficient for jurisdiction, even though the plaintiffs alleged federal issues in their complaint. See id.
66. Id. at 152.
67. See Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy. Why the WellPleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS

L.J. 597, 607-26 (1987).

The Mottley opinion stated that the rule set forth therein was first announced much
earlier, in Metcalf v. Waterton, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). Mottley, 211 U.S. at 154. This
incorrect description of the state of the law before Mottley is perhaps the main reason why
no one questions the assertion that Hans' claim was a constitutional one. In fact, as discussed later, not only did Metcalf not presage the Mottley rule, it was contrary to it. See
infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
Good evidence that the Mottley Court completely misread Metcalf is found in a case
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Specifically, in Smith v. Greenhow,6 8 a state bondholder case
decided one year before Carter and six years before Hans, the
Court found federal question jurisdiction, in the process characterizing the claim, defenses and responses the same way it did in
Carter. Smith was a removal case involving bonds issued by the
state of Virginia to a Virginia citizen. The plaintiff had sued a tax
collector in a Virginia state court for seizing his belongings for
non-payment of state taxes which the plaintiff had sought to pay
in coupons clipped from his state bonds.69 The Court described the
pleading sequence as it searched for a federal question that would
have justified removing the case to federal court. The plaintiff
filed a "declaration in trespass"' 0 alleging the seizure:
[t]o this declaration the defendant filed a plea in bar,[71] justifying the alleged trespasses, by setting out [the plaintiff's non-payment of taxes and the defendant's authority to seize the plaintiff's property as a consequence] . . . .To this plea the plaintiff

filed a replication,[ 72 ] alleging a previous tender, in payment of
said taxes, of coupons .. .which, however, the defendant re-

fused to accept in payment thereof. To this replication the defendant rejoined[ 73 ] that, by [a new state statute], he was forbidden to receive the said coupons

. . .

and to that rejoinder the

plaintiff demurred. [74]
Had the trespass claim made out a federal constitutional claim,

decided ten years before Mottley and eight years after Hans. In Tennessee v. Union &
Planter's Bank, the majority used Metcalf to support the conclusion that a federal issue
raised as a defense was insufficient for federal question jurisdiction. 152 U.S. 454, at 46061 (1898). But Justice Harlan, the author of Metcalf, objected to the majority's conclusion. Id. at 468, 470-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Doernberg, supra, at 612-14
(arguing that Metcalf is not the source of the well-pleaded complaint rule). Moreover, even
if Metcalf stood for the proposition for which it was cited in Mottley, this fact was widely
ignored until at least 1894. See cases and sources cited infra notes 78-82.
68. 109 U.S. 669 (1884).
69. Id. at 669-72.
70. "The declaration is a statement of all material facts constituting the plaintiff's

cause of action in a methodical and legal form." B. SHIPMAN,

HANDBOOK OF COMMON

93 (1894).
71. A plea in bar "must generally deny all or some part of the averments of fact in
the declaration, or, admitting them to be true, allege new facts which avoid or repel their
legal effect." Id. at 99.
72. "The replication is the plaintiff's answer to the plea of the defendant." Id. at
100.
73. "The pleadings subsequent to the replication are the rejoinder and rebutter of the
defendant ......
Id. at 100.
74. Smith, 109 U.S. at 669-70 (footnotes added).
A demurrer "admits the truth of all matters sufficiently pleaded on the other side, but
denies their sufficiency in law." B. SHIPMAN, supra note 69, at 260.
LAW PLEADING
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the Court would have stopped at that point. Instead, the Court
held that the case was properly removed to federal court as one

arising under federal law because, according to the Court,
[t]he [plaintiff's] demurrer in effect denies the validity of [the
new] law [prohibiting payment of taxes with coupons], and upon
the record no ground of its invalidity can be inferred, except
that it is avoided by the operation of [the contracts clause of the
Constitution]. It therefore sufficiently appears upon the record
that the plaintiff's case arises under the Constitution of the
United States. 5

Smith, then, confirms two points. First, it confirms the way
that both the majority in Carter and the dissent in Marye viewed
state bondholder suits: as common law claims accompanied by a
contracts clause rejoinder to the state's defense to those claims.

Second, it confirms that suits involving state bonds and the contracts clause would have been understood to "arise under" federal
law despite the fact that such plaintiffs asserted only non-federal
claims.76
Of course, Smith was a removal case - not an original jurisdiction case. However, had it been an original case, federal question jurisdiction would have been sustained so long as the plaintiff
alleged in his complaint the federal issue that would arise something that Hans clearly did.7 This is confirmed by an original jurisdiction case, Metcalf v. Watertown,78 decided two years
75. Smith, 109 U.S. at 670-71 (citing Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (I
Wall.) 116 (1864)).
In Bridge Proprietors,the Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction under section
25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, because the validity of a state statute had been called into
question as repugnant to the Constitution, even though this was not mentioned in any of
the pleadings in the courts below. The Court held that it could take judicial notice of the
existence of the federal issue. Bridge Proprietors, 168 U.S. (I Wall.) at 142. If the Smith
Court's reliance on Bridge Proprietorsindicates that it intended to equate the federal issue
tests of the 1789 Act and the 1875 Act, then it demonstrates just how loosely the Court
was treating parties' attempts to allege federal questions.
76. Presaging Smith, the Court observed in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12
(1883), decided just three months before Smith, that Congress generally would not have
had the power to "draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally,"
but "under the broad provisions of" the 1875 federal question statute, federal courts probably have "direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a State law." Id.
77. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890) (quoted in part, supra text accompanying note 38).
It would make no difference that the contracts clause issue was never reached in Hans,
since it is well-established that the issue is whether the case involved federal issues and not
whether it was determined by them. See supra note 56.
78. 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
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before Hans.
In Metcalf, the plaintiff sued to collect on a federal court

judgment, which the Court observed "s[ought] to enforce an ordinary right of property" and thus presented no federal claim."
This non-federal claim was met by a state law defense that the
suit was too late, running afoul of a state statute of limitations

setting a ten year life for such judgments. The plaintiff argued without pleading it in his complaint - that this statute violated
the federal Constitution. Though the Court dismissed the plain-

tiff's case, Justice Harlan's opinion noted that the problem was
that "the case, as presented by the record," was not one arising
under the Constitution because the constitutional issue was nowhere mentioned in the pleadings. 80 The Court suggested that

there might have been federal question jurisdiction if the plaintiff
had indicated, "by proper averment, how the determination of any
question of [a federal] character is involved in the case." 81 Conse-

quently, the Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court "to
determine whether the pleadings [could] be so amended as to present a case within its jurisdiction."82

79. Id. at 588.
80. Id. at 590.
81. Id. at 588.
82. Id. at 590. See also Doernberg, supra note 67, at 612-14 (discussing Metcalf).
Metcalf was one of only three original jurisdiction cases decided by the Court before
the era of Planters' Bank and Mottley. Though both of the other two cases denied jurisdiction, they are not inconsistent with the notion that a plaintiff's case would arise under
federal law if he or she pleaded a rejoinder to an anticipated defense.
For instance, in Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522 (1887), the plaintiff sued to
recover land granted to him under a federal patent. However, his claim depended on clarifying the description in the patent rather than construing any federal law. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant would contest his claim based on a different federal patent.
However, the defendant did not do so. The Court held that the case did not arise under
federal law, because, even if the complaint's anticipation of the defense and rejoinder were
sufficient for jurisdiction,
it was taken away as soon as the answers were in, because if there was jurisdiction at all it was by reason of the averments in the complaint as to what the
defences against the title of the plaintiffs would be, and these were of no avail as
soon as the answers were filed and it was made to appear that no such defences
were relied on.
Id. at 524.
Likewise, in City of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889), the plaintiffs incorrectly
anticipated a defense (a state statute impairing their contract) and alleged a federal rejoinder to that defense (the contracts clause). However, the defendants admitted that the statute would not apply and the plaintiffs won their contract claim. The Court dismissed, observing that jurisdiction could not be based on a potential rejoinder to a defense that
proved irrelevant to the case. Id. at 43-44. See generally Doernberg, supra note 67, at 611612, 614-15. Had the anticipated defense been applicable in either of these cases, it can be
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Not only did non-federal claims with federal rejoinders present cases arising under federal law, the Court implied in 1887
that plaintiffs alleging purely state law claims presented cases
arising under federal law so long as the defendant's defense raised
a federal issue.83 Moreover, by 1890, the Court had not yet de-

implied that a federal question would have been raised - despite the presence of clearly
non-federal claims.
These cases are perhaps explainable as sub silentio applications of the provisions of
the 1875 Act that provided for dismissal if "it shall appear . . . at any time after [a] suit
has been brought or removed . . . that such suit does not really and substantially involve a
dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of [the] circuit court." Act of March
3, 1875, ch. 127, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982)).
83. See Doernberg, supra note 67, at 611-12 (discussing Robinson and the implication that a plaintiff's anticipation of a federal defense could establish federal jurisdiction).
For original jurisdiction, the plaintiff would have to anticipate a federal defense in its
pleading. The Court did not put a stop to this practice until 1894. See Tennessee v. Union
& Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894) (discussed supra note 67).
The removal cases most clearly show how a case'arises under federal law where a
federal defense is raised against a state-law claim. For cases where one possible ground for
federal jurisdiction was a contingent federal defense, see Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115
U.S. 1, 11 (1885); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, Il1 U.S. 449, 462 (1884); Railroad
Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1880). The wide-open jurisdiction days for removal did not come to an end until Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102 (1894)..
One might argue that Smith and other removal cases are irrelevant to an original
jurisdiction case such as Hans, because the standards for removal were more liberal. Indeed the Court in Metcalf, five years after Smith, drew a distinction between removal and
original "arising under" jurisdiction that implied as much. See Metcalf, 128 U.S. at 589.
However, this is not a correct reading of Metcalf. As discussed earlier, supra notes 78-82
and accompanying text, the problem in Metcalf was that the plaintiff had not alleged that
a federal issue would arise in defense. The same test of "arising under" jurisdiction was
applied in both original and removal cases: was a federal issue disclosed in any of the
pleadings? Any difference in result arose out of the practical difference between original
and removal cases. In original cases, the plaintiff's complaint was the only pleading at the
time jurisdiction was questioned and, unless the plaintiff with a non-federal claim anticipated a federal defense in its complaint, there would be no arising under jurisdiction. In the
removal cases though, "the grounds of [fnederal jurisdiction were disclosed either in the
[defendant's] pleadings, or in the petition or affidavit for removal." Metcalf, 128 U.S. at
589 (emphasis deleted).
Further, a more liberal test for removal jurisdiction under the statute at the time of
Metcalf and Smith would have made no sense, because both plaintiffs and defendants
could remove until the amendments of 1887. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18
Stat. 470, 470-471, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. Thus,
prior to 1877, a plaintiff, worried that a stricter "arising under" test would apply if he filed
his case originally in federal court, could simply file it in state court and immediately file
for removal in order to take advantage of the more liberal test applied to removal cases.
See Doernberg, supra note 67, at 605 (explaining the apparent anomaly created by the
1887 Act that "permitted plaintiff's access to a federal court if they anticipated a federal
defense and therefore proceeded in the federal court in the first instance, but denied them
such access if they sued in state court originally, were met with a federal defense, and
attempted to remove.").
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cided that statutory "arising under" jurisdiction was any narrower

than article III "arising under" jurisdiction as corstrued expansively in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.84
The legislative history of the 1875 Act certainly provided little basis for making the statute any narrower than article III,
since it indicated unambiguously that Congress intended them to
be the same,15 and the Court so stated in 1884.86 As late as 1893,
the unanimous Court was prepared to state, in reference to the
1875 Act, that the "intention of Congress [was] manifest . . . to

vest in the Circuit Courts of the United States full and effectual
jurisdiction, as contemplated by the Constitution, over each of the
classes of controversies . . .mentioned."87

84. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
As the Court has noted in more recent times, "Osborn . . .reflects a broad conception
of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according to which Congress may confer on the federal
courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal law." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983). Article
IIIuses the same "arising under" language, but it is now conceded that article III is much
broader than the statute. Id. at 494-95.
85. Senator Carpenter, the president pro tempore of the Senate, and apparently the
only member of Congress to discuss the bill on the floor of the Senate, observed that the
1815 act "gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers - nothing more, nothing less." Doernberg, supra note 67, at 603 (quoting 2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874)); see
also Our Federal Judiciary,2 CENT. L.J. 551, 553 (1875) (with the 1875 Act, "Congress
has exhausted its power; and has conferred upon the federal courts all the jurisdiction
authorized by the Constitution").
86. Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, Il1 U.S. 449, 469-72 (1884) (the Court believed that Congress intended the constitutional language to define the scope of the
statute).
Osborn's view of "arising under" jurisdiction still held sway in construing the scope of
the Act in 1885, when the Court, in the Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, relied on Osborn to
construe the statute to cover an even more strained situation than that presented by Osborn: suits on non-federal causes of action against federally chartered corporations. Pacific
R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 11-19. Interestingly, Justice Bradley, the author of
Hans, wrote the majority opinion in the Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, over a dissent objecting that "Congress did not intend to give the words 'arising under ... ' in the Act of
1875, the broad meaning they have when used" in Osborn. Id. at 24 (Waite, C.J.,
dissenting).
87. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 659 (1893).
Beyond the influence of Osborn, the Court had set the stage for a rather expansive
view of the 1875 Act in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879). Davis involved a different removal statute than the 1875 Act, one that allowed a federal official to remove a case
brought against him in state court on the ground that it involved acts done under authority
of the federal revenue laws. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, §67, 14 Stat. 98, 171.
In Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135 (1880), the Court repeated language
from Davis, although Railroad Co. involved the construction of the 1875 Act, observing:
"[c]ases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation
of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim, or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted." RailroadCo., 102 U.S.

1989-90]

TAMING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

In light of Carter, Smith, Justice Bradley's dissent in Marye,
and the cases concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the Court in
Hans could only have assumed that Hans' cause of action was one
for common-law breach of contract. Moreover, the Court must
have assumed that the fact that he pleaded a contracts clause rejoinder to the state's anticipated defense made the case one "arising under" federal law.88
D.

Reading Hans in Context

Turning to an examination of the Hans opinion itself, that
opinion implicitly embodies this contemporary understanding of
the scope of the contracts clause and federal jurisdiction. Further,
the insights gained from reading Carter, Smith, and the Marye
dissent, give meaning to certain aspects of the Hans opinion that
might otherwise seem superfluous, contradictory, or cryptic.
In Hans, Justice Bradley began his discussion of Hans' claim
and the eleventh amendment in the following terms:
In the present case the plaintiff in error contends that he, being
a citizen of Louisiana, is not embarrassed by the obstacle of the
Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by the citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State. It is
true, the amendment does so read: and if there were no other
reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable;
and then we should have this anomalous result, that in cases
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a
State may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens,
though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued

at 141 (quoting Davis, 100 U.S. at 264); cf. Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989)

(removal based on status as federal employee proper under statute only if a federal defense
is interposed).
88. It is unlikely that Justice Bradley, the author of Hans, would have been strict
about finding a federal question since he was also the author of the Pacific R.R. Removal
Cases, see supra note 85, the "high-water mark" of expansive views of "arising under"
jurisdiction. Doernberg, supra note 67, at 623.
Justice Frankfurter once quoted Professor Mishkin for the proposition that the Pacific
R.R. Removal Cases were so overly broad in their view of arising under jurisdiction as to
be considered by the modern Court as a "sport." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Mishkin, The Federal "'Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 157, 160 n.24 (1953)); see also Gully v.
First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936) ("[l]ooking backward we can see that the early
cases [testing when there was federal question jurisdiction] were less exacting than the
recent ones in respect of some of these conditions").
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in the federal courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in
its own courts.8 .
If the point of Hans is that the eleventh amendment bars federal
law claims against states to the same extent as non-federal claims,
the Court stated the proposition obliquely - given that many
cases "arising under" federal law involved solely non-federal law
claims 90 and that suits involving state bonds were considered suits
to enforce the terms of the contract. 9 ' The opinion does not differentiate according to the source of law authorizing the claim. It
does differentiate according to the citizenship of the plaintiffs and
it underscores the similarity between a suit brought by a citizen
of the state and one brought by a foreign citizen, observing that in
both situations the state is "sued for a like cause of action." 92 It is
just this assumption, that drawing a distinction between diversity
and non-diversity bond cases would produce a "anomalous result",
which is reflected in the reasoning the Court used later: that given
this lack of difference, the framers of the eleventh amendment
would have intended to bar actions against a state by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.93
It is, of course, still possible that Justice Bradley meant that
the claims in the two categories of cases were equally barred by a
sovereign immunity doctrine of constitutional dimensions. However, he did not say so and, in any event, he failed to identify any
constitutional source for the immunity which he later found
barred Hans' claim. If he viewed Hans' claim as a constitutional
one, he would have justified the immunity defense in constitutional terms. Instead, he eliminated the eleventh amendment as a
source, and he stated that the case should be dismissed only if

89. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
Immediately before the quoted passage, the Court pointed out that some of its prior
cases, which involved out-of-state bondholders suing states, also involved allegations that
the states' laws repudiating the bonds violated the contracts clause. According to the
Court, this indicated that a state could not be sued by out-of-staters "on the mere ground
that the case [wa]s one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id.;
see also id. at 9-10 (given that out-of-state citizens could not sue, the issue in the case was
"whether it is true where one of the parties is a State, and is sued as a defendant by one of
its own citizens").
90. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
92. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
93. See id. at 15 ("Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states,
was indignantly repelled?").
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there was some "other reason or ground for abating his suit." 4
Whatever "other reason or ground" Justice Bradley had in mind,
he failed to support it by reference to any part of the Constitution
or its overall structure.9 5
Even more telling than what Justice Bradley did not do is
what he did do in seeking to identify the nature of that ground: he
adopted and applied Justice Iredell's reasoning from his dissenting
opinion in Chisholm. This is crucial, because Justice Iredell
clearly pointed to common-law sovereign immunity as the basis
for his conclusion that Chisholm's claim was barred.96 Justice
Bradley's adoption of Justice Iredell's reasoning succeeds only if
Hans' claim, like Chisholm's, was a common-law claim that was
barred by common-law sovereign immunity.97
Justice Bradley's careful reading and understanding of Justice Iredell's opinion is evidenced by the fact that his analysis virtually tracks that given by the proponents of the common law immunity theory of the eleventh amendment.98 Like them, Justice
Bradley separated the two issues which the majority in Chisholm
commingled: (1) whether there was subject matter jurisdiction,
and (2) whether there was a common law remedy. 9 He pointed
out that the vice of the Chisholm majority opinion was not the
failure to affirm some constitutionally based immunity, but the argument that article III authorized the Court to ignore common
law sovereign immunity and thus create a common law assuipsit
remedy against a state. The eleventh amendment, he explained,
was neutral on the issue of immunity: "[ilt did not in terms prohibit suits by individuals against the States, but declared that [article III of] the Constitution should not be construed to import
any power to authorize the bringing of such suits." 100 Thus, he
believed that the Chisholm majority had disregarded the "former
experience and usage" of the general common law.
[T]hey [the majority] felt constrained to see in this language [of

94. Id. at 10.
95.

Structural arguments were not unknown to the Court -

especially in the area

of intergovernmental immunities. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 425-37 (1819) (holding that the overall structure of the Constitution implied that the
federal government was immune from state taxation).
96. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 15 and the accompanying text.
100. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
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article III] a power to enable the individual citizens of one
State, or of a foreign state, to sue another State of the Union in
the federal courts. Justice Iredell, on the contrary, contended
that it was not the intention to create new and unheardof remedies, by subjecting sovereign States to actions at the suit of individuals, (which he conclusively showed was never done before,)
but only, by proper legislation, to invest the federal courts with
jurisdiction to hear and determine controversies and cases, between the parties designated, that were properly susceptible of
litigation in courts.'0'

Since "[t]he suability of a [s]tate without its consent was a thing
unknown to the [general common] law,"' 1 2 Chisholm's claim was
thus not "properly susceptible of litigation in courts,"'1 0 3 notwithstanding the grant of subject matter jurisdiction over suits against
states. By drawing the parallel to Chisholm, Justice Bradley could
only have been implying that Hans' claim, like Chisholm's, was an
assumpsit claim that failed for the same reasons: the common-law
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Justice Bradley's selectivity in drawing on Justice Iredell's
Chisholm dissent supports this view as well. After all, Justice Iredell did mention the question of suing states on constitutional
claims, opining in dictum that such claims would also be barred,
unless Congress had authorized them by statute.0 4 Yet, despite
the fact that these views on constitutional claims were the only
parts of Justice Iredell's opinion that were relevant to a constitutional claim, Justice Bradley failed to mention them. Clearly, Justice Bradley was fully conversant with Justice Iredell's opinion
and felt "at liberty to prefer Justice Iredell's views" over those of
the Chisholm majority.' 5 Surely he would have referenced that
part of the opinion had he believed that Hans had asserted a con06
stitutional claim.1
101. Id. at 12 (emphasis added); see also id. at 18 ("no anomalous and unheard-of
proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by [article III]"); Field, Part I, supra
note 4, at 536-38 (review of contemporary sources supports the view that article III left
common-law immunity unchanged, rather than creating a new source of immunity).
102. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16.
103. Id. at 12.
104. See supra note 27.
105. Hans, 134 U.S. at 19.
106. It is possible that Justice Bradley ignored Justice Iredell's dictum-observation,
because Congress had passed "a new law . . . necessary for the purpose," Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) of suing states on federal
law claims - the federal question statute of 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18
Stat. 470; cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2295-303 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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The Hans Court's use of Hamilton's Federalist No. 81 supports this view of the type of claim asserted. At the same time, the
insights gained from the revised view of Hans' claim argued here
clear up what has always seemed like a contradiction in Hamilton's views on sovereign immunity. In his essay, Hamilton asserted
on the one hand that states gave up such sovereignty as was conceded in the "plan of the convention"; yet, he maintained in the
same passage that "there [wa]s no color to pretend that the state
governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of
the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from
every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good
faith."'11 7 No conflict exists if one reads further and considers the
Hans Court's quotation of Hamilton's reason for that statement
was that, "[t]he contracts between a nation and individuals are
only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will."' 08 If this statement is taken as a
description of the then-established common law, Hamilton was arguing that the contracts clause portion of the "plan of the convention" voided any state statute which impaired contract obligations,
but that there would still be no rebovery against the state because
the common law conferred no such right.
The Court's "additional reason" in refusing to maintain
Hans' suit is also consistent with this view: Justice Bradley found
it significant that the jurisdiction bestowed by the 1875 statute
provided that circuit courts would have original jurisdiction for all
suits of a civil nature arising under federal law "[c]oncurrent with

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the federal question statute is
sufficient to abrogate state immunity if it is only common law immunity). However, it is
not likely that a statute granting subject matter jurisdiction is what Justice Iredell had in
mind when he mentioned "new laws." More likely he envisioned a statute creating such
claims or giving the federal courts the power to create them. This is the only position that

would have been consistent with the major argument of his dissent -

that a grant of

subject matter jurisdiction did not authorize any new common law claims.

It is equally unlikely that that is what the Hans Court would have had in mind, since
it tracks Justice Iredell's reasoning on this point. Hans contrasted Justice Iredell's view
that article III grants power "only, by proper legislation, to invest the federal courts with
jurisdiction to hear" suits against states that "were properly susceptible of litigation in
courts" with the view that article III also authorized the federal courts "to create new and

unheard of remedies." Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 529-30 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1976), quoted
in Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
108. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 107, at
530) (emphasis added).
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the courts of the several States."' 10 9 After quoting the statute, he

asked rhetorically:
Does not this qualification show that Congress, in legislating to
carry the Constitution into effect, did not intend to invest its
courts with any new and strangejurisdictions? The state courts
have no power to entertain suits by individuals against a State
without its consent. .Then how does the circuit court, having
only concurrent jurisdiction, acquire any such power?"'
Using the scope of relief permitted in state courts as the
gauge for the federal courts' power supports the idea that neither

the claim nor the immunity involved in Hans was founded on the
Constitution. First, if the immunity involved was a constitutional
one, then it would directly bar claims in federal court, and thus
there would be no need to filter the claim through the experience
of state courts. Moreover, state court decisions would be a strange

place to look for authority if the Court viewed the case as involving a federal constitutional claim and immunity. However, it was
the consistent practice of the Court to rely on state court cases

when determining questions of general common law."' It is, of
course, true that state courts would be as qualified to determine
the scope of federal constitutional claims and immunities as the

federal courts. However, the cases referred to in Hans, regarding
the nature and extent of state immunity, were not referenced for
their contributions to the law of the contracts clause or any other

part of the Constitution. Instead, like Chisholm, those cases discussed sovereign immunity in general common law terms. For example, the Court cited Beers v. Arkansas,"2 which held that the
state could not be sued on its contract, and which was based on
"an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized na-

109.

Hans, 134 U.S. at 18 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,

470).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
The reference to concurrent jurisdiction was removed from the statute in the 1911
revision. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1091 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330-31 (1982); cf. Jackson, supra note 4, at 124 (suggesting that a modern
case identical to Hans could be distinguished on the basis of this statutory revision).
I11. See Fletcher, The General Common Law, supra note 34 at 1558-62 (citing
authorities).
112. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857), cited in Hans, 134 U.S. at 17.
In Beers, an Arkansas bond law was amended, after a suit was filed, to require that
the bonds be filed with the court. Beers, 61 U.S. at 528. The suit was dismissed for failure
of the plaintiffs to do so, and the Atate supreme court affirmed. The Supreme Court of the
United States dismissed the appeal on grounds of sovereign immunity. Id. at 529.
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tions." 113 The Hans Court also relied on Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky. "14
' The Hans Court interpreted Briscoe as holding that no
suit would lie, based on the fact that it "believed that there [wa]s
no case where a suit has been brought, at any time, on bills of
credit against a State; and it is certain that no suit could have
been maintained on this ground prior to the Constitution.""' 5
These references are clearly to common law claims and commonlaw sovereign immunity - not to claims or immunities of constitutional stature."16
The Hans Court's use of the federal question statute, which
required that the federal courts look to the law applied in state
courts, directly parallelled similar "rule of decision" aspects of
Chisholm, upon which the proponents of a common law sovereign
immunity theory of the eleventh amendment rely."1 7 Justice Iredell based his Chisholm dissent in part on section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that the courts of the United
States "shall have [the] power to issue [various specified writs]
.. . and all other writs not specially provided for by statute,
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.""' 8
Justice Iredell read this last phrase as a further indication that
article III and its implementing statute were not to be construed

113.
114.
115.
at 321).

Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (quoting Beers, 61 U.S. (20.How.) at 529).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
Hans, 134 U.S. at 16 (misquoting, nonsubstantively, Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)

One could argue that the citation of state cases was simply an indication that the
immunity from suit in federal court should be as broad as it was in state court, thereby
barring all claims. This assumes, however, that state courts could refuse to handle federal
claims, a proposition that is clearly untrue today and was probably untrue then. See Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (causes of actions created by
federal regulations may be enforced in state courts); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130

(1876) (if exclusive jurisdiction is not conferred on the federal courts, the state courts may
be resorted to if they would otherwise have jurisdiction).
116.

The Hans Court also quoted from another bondholder case, Cunningham v.

Macon & B. R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883), where the Court observed that "[i]t may be
accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States

can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent." Hans, 134
U.S. at 17 (alternations added) (quoting Cunningham, i09 U.S. at 451). Cunningham likewise failed to identify any constitutional source for this statement, so it should be taken as
dealing only with a common law contract claim.
117. See supra note 19 and text accompanying notes 15-21.

118.

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81, construed in Chisholm v.

Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433-34 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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as empowering federal courts to change common-law rules. 119 Section 14 was thus "calculated to guard against that innovating

spirit of courts of justice,"' 120 and it thus directed federal courts
handling common law claims, such as Chisholm's, to follow "principles and usages of law already well known"'' - the existing
common law. After reviewing the law of Georgia and the several
states, and after determining that it uniformly failed to authorize
an assumpsit action against a state,'22 Justice Iredell determined
that that common-law deficit was enough to support the dismissal

of Chisholm's claim.
Justice Bradley's opinion in Hans read the 1875 Act's con-

current jurisdiction clause as having a similar effect as section 14
of the 1789 Act. By directing federal courts to follow the law applied in state courts in a contract dispute, the statute directed the
Court to the same source of law: the general common law. Justice
Bradley surveyed that law and reached the same conclusion that
Justice Iredell did.' 2 ' Justice Bradley also explicitly recognized
this parallel to Justice Iredell's opinion. Immediately after making

his point with the rhetorical question that concluded the concurrent jurisdiction quotation mentioned earlier, 24 he observed:
It is true that the same qualification existed in the [J]udiciary
[A]ct of 1789, which was before the court in Chisholm ... ,
and the majority of the court did not think that it was sufficient
to limit the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Justice Iredell
thought differently. In view of the manner in which that decision
was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh

119. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 434-36 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 434.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 434-35 (quote in relevant part, supra note 19).
123. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. The "rule of decision" aspects
of the Hans Court's use of the 1875 Act, and Justice Iredell's use of the 1789 Act, differed
from that of the real Rules of Decision Act then in effect under the regime of Swift v.
Tyson. The 1875 act operated to bind the federal courts, not only to state statutory law,
but also to state decisional law applying the general common law - at least on the question of the scope of common law claims. See supra note 34. This is Professor Amar's point
about Chisholm: that the Chisholm majority made -and the eleventh amendment corrected - a rule-of-decision mistake - not a mistake about constitutionally secured immunity or subject matter jurisdiction. Amar, supra note 4, at 1467-73; see supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
Professor Amar's point, as it relates to Chisholm, is misunderstood and criticized in
Marshall, Diversity Theory, supra note 4, at 1390-92 (Amar's view conflicts with the regime of Swift v. Tyson which would have been the Framers' view of what law applied in
federal courts).
124. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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Amendment, the light of history and the reason of the thing, we
think we5 are at liberty to prefer Justice Iredell's views in this
12
regard.
This additional link between Hans and Justice Iredell's Chisholm
dissent makes it difficult to read them as inconsistent on the question of what type of claim and immunity were involved.
E.

Contemporary State Bond Cases Relied Upon in Hans

This notion - that the problem was applying the common
law rather than the Constitution - explains the holding in a case
upon which Hans relied, Louisiana v. Jumel.12 Jumel involved.
the very same bond issuance and repudiation by the state as those
which formed the basis for Hans' claim. The majority held that
the suit to force state officers to set aside and apply an appropriation to payment of interest on state bonds could not be maintained. Without mentioning the federal question statute, the Court
observed that the remedy that the plaintiffs sought in federal
court was not available in the Louisiana courts:
Neither was there when the bonds were issued, nor is there now,
any statute or judicial decision giving the bondholders a remedy
in the State courts or elsewhere, either by mandamus or injunction, against the State in its political capacity, to compel it to do
2
what it has agreed should be done, but which it refuses to do.1 1
Justice Harlan's dissent was devoted almost exclusively to proving
the opposite proposition, relying not only on Louisiana case law,
but also on English precedent regarding the scope of relief available at common law against the Crown. 2 '
The previous quotation suggests an alternative formulation of
the common-law sovereign immunity theory of Hans that amounts
to the same thing: since contracts incorporate existing law and
since the law provides that the state cannot be sued on its contracts without its consent, this is enough reason in-and-of-itself to
deny recovery according to the implied terms of the contract. 12

125. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890).
126. 107 U.S. 711 (1882), cited in id., at 10.
127. Jumel, 107 U.S. at 720.
128. Id. at 746-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. See McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S.(2 How.) 608, 612 (1844) (the "binding
force [of a contract] depends on the laws in existence when it is made; these are necessarily
referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to
perform them by one party, and the right acquired by the other"); Ogden v. Sauders, 25
U.S.(12 Wheat.) 213, 259 (1827) (Washington, J.,) (the law governing the contract, is
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This idea underlies the Court's rationale in In re Ayres,13 0 upon
which Hans relied. 13' This is also the thrust of Beers v. Arkansas,"32
' from which the Hans Court quoted extensively. In its discussion of Beers, the Hans Court described the law setting up the
state bonds as "not a contract," and it stated that "'[i]n exercising [its] power [to insulate itself from suit] the State violated no
contract with the parties.' "133 Thus, the state law in Beers making redemption of coupons more difficult impaired no contractual
obligation, since the state was never subject to judicial compulsion
regarding the contract.13 4 Though this theory seems far-reaching,

"the municipal law of the State, whether that be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout, wherever its performance is sought to be enforced"); J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1380 (2d ed. 1851) ("the civil obligation of contracts
• . . is recognized by and results from the law of the State in which it is made").
The word "state" was used in these instances in its international sense. This use did
not mean to suggest, contrary to the Swift doctrine, that the Court perceived that the
common law of contracts varied from state to state, or that the common law was readily
identifiable as "state" as opposed to "general" law. See supra note 34 (discussing the concept of general law under the Swift doctrine).
130. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
131. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
The Ayres Court explained:
It cannot be doubted that the [eleventh] Amendment to the Constitution
operates to create an important distinction between contracts of a State with
individuals and contracts between individual parties. . . . In respect to [contracts with a state], by virtue of the [eleventh] Amendment to the Constitution,
there being no remedy by a suit against the State, the contract is substantially
without sanction, except that which arises out of the honor and good faith of the
State itself. . . ..
Ayres, 123 U.S. at 504-05. In referring to the eleventh amendment as the reason for the
absence of a remedy, this statement is admittedly ambiguous, and one must assume what
was unclear until Hans: that the eleventh amendment simply restored common-law sovereign immunity in accordance with Justice Iredell's dissenting position in Chisholm.
132. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1858).
133. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1890) (quoting Beers, 61 U.S. at 52930).
Since Beers was a suit appealed from Arkansas state courts, the eleventh amendment
was irrelevant.
134. The Hans Court also cited Daniel Webster's letter to another state bondholder:
"The [only] security for state loans . . . is the plighted faith of the [s]tate as a political
community." Hans, 134 U.S. at 16 (quoting a letter from Daniel Webster to Baring Brothers & Co. (October 16, 1839)).
This idea also explains Hamilton's remarks in FEDERALIST No. 81. See supra notes
107-08 and accompanying text.
There are also hints of this alternative theory in Justice Iredell's Chisholm opinion:
Now let us consider the case of a debt due from a State. . . . Every man
must know that no suit can lie against a legislative body. His only dependence
therefore can be, that the legislature on principles of public duty, will make a
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it demonstrates another manner in which the Hans Court analyzed the suit and state immunity as presenting a common law
135
rather than a constitutional problem.
F.

Evidence from Hans that Constitutional Claims Would Not
Be Barred By State Immunity

The analysis so far indicates how the claim made in Hans
could only have been understood by the Court to be'a non-federal
claim to recover on the contract itself, which was barred by common law sovereign immunity. There is also evidence in Hans that,
had a proper constitutional claim been made, common law sovereign immunity would not have been a bar. 1 6 The Hans Court recognized this in the penultimate paragraph of Justice Bradley's
majority opinion:
To avoid misapprehension it may be proper to add that, although the obligations of a State rest for their performance

provision for the execution of their own contracts, and if that fails, what ever
reproach the legislature may incur, the case is certainly without remedy in any
of the Courts of the State.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 445-46 (1793) (Iredell, J.,dissenting).
135. One might argue that this theory, that a state's immunity to suit is an implied
term of the contract, cannot be valid because it is inconsistent with the Court's holding in
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810), that the contracts clause applied to contracts to which the state was a party when the state reneged on its obligations. See id. at
139; Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1997-98 (suggesting this inconsistency). This objection fails
to take into account that there were numerous cases where the validity of state contracts
was drawn into question, but where sovereign immunity was irrelevant because the parties
to the lawsuit were private persons or entities. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (action in trover by private college against an individual);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (breach of covenant action arising from
land conveyance between private individuals).
This theory is more hardpressed to explain why municipalities may be sued, since at
common law they customarily shared the immunity of the. state. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1980) (at common law, a municipality was an "arm of
the [s]tate," that could only be sued with its consent or that of the state); 18 E. McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

279 (3d ed. 1984) (common law immunity for municipali-

ties was based on the idea that the municipality acted for the public benefit as an agent of
the state). Nonetheless, suits against them do not violate the eleventh amendment. See
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) ("The [e]leventh [a]mendment limits
• ..jurisdiction only as to suits against a [s]tate"); Gibbons, supra note 4, at 2001-02
(suggesting that the Court in Lincoln County held that municipalities could be amenable to
suit, because it feared the Court's fear that a failure to so hold would cause a panic in the
municipal bond markets).
136. It was in this way that the Hans opinion explained the "plan of the convention"
exception to which Hamilton referred in THE FEDERALIST No. 81 in a manner consistent
with the theory here. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1890); supra notes 107-08
and accompanying text.
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upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subject
of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued, or
comes itself into court; yet where property or rights are enjoyed
under a grant or contract made by a State, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit
to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially
resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under
which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to
,affect their enjoyment.137
Justice Bradley made it clear in his dissent in Marye v. Parsons"'8 that such "judicial resistance" could entail affirmative
suits against the state. Justice Bradley's Marye dissent is important because his position there was exactly the same as his majority position five years later in Hans: he believed that the state
bondholders' claims were barred by sovereign immunity but
wished to make it clear that sovereign immunity would not bar
constitutional claims. In the process, he distinguished true constitutional contract clause claims from the common-law contract enforcement claims involved in the bond cases. Specifically, after explaining that the bondholder's claims in the Virginia Coupon
Cases were only claims to enforce the contract with the state that
should be barred, he observed:
But, then, it will be asked, has the citizen no redress against the
unconstitutional acts or laws of the State? Certainly he has.
There is no difficulty on the subject. Whenever his life, liberty,
or property is threatened, assailed or invaded by unconstitutional
acts.

. .

he may defend himself, in every proper way, by habeas

corpus, by defence of prosecutions, by actions brought on his
own behalf, by injunction, by mandamus. Any one of these
modes of redress, suitable to his case, is open to him. A citizen
cannot, in any way, be harassed,injured or destroyed by unconstitutional laws without having some legal means of resistance
or redress. But this is where the State or its officers moves
against him. The right to all these means of protection and redress against unconstitutional oppression and exaction is a very
different thing from the right to coerce the State into a fulfillment of its contracts. 39

137. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
138. 114 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1884) (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 4849 and accompanying text (reference to the historical and procedural context of Marye).
139. Marye, 114 U.S. at 335-336 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Unfortunately, Justice Bradley was not specific in identifying
the precise constitutional bases for the claims he had in mind. The
reference in Hans was to violating "property or rights acquired
1 which suggests that, despite the
under [the state's] contract,"' 40

contracts clause's limited defensive role in the standard bondholder suits, 14 1 a creditor would still have a "true" contracts
clause claim if property passed under the contract to the creditor
and the state sought to get it back.142 In his Marye dissent, he

referred to "life, liberty, or property [that] is threatened, assailed
or invaded by unconstitutional acts," thereby suggesting the viability of due process clause claims; and, more broadly, any claim
brought against "the unconstitutional acts or laws of the [s]tate"
and all manner of "unconstitutional oppression and exaction."' 43
One might argue that, in these passages, Justice Bradley really had in mind the officer-suit fiction ultimately adopted by the
Court eighteen years later in Ex parte Young.1 44 Under this doc-

trine, suits against state officers were held not barred by the eleventh amendment, because they were not against the state -

since

state officers acting unconstitutionally cannot be representatives of
the state. 45 However, in the very same section of the dissent in
Marye as that quoted, Justice Bradley explicitly rejected such a
theory:

140. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.
141. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
142. See Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891), discussed infra notes 22837 and accompanying text. In Marye, Justice Bradley distinguished several earlier cases
where recovery was had against states or their officers because
[i]n all [those] cases, the State [had] attempted to do some unconstitutional act
injurious to the party, or some act which it had entered into a contract not to do;
and redress was sought against such aggressive act; they, none of them, exhibit
the case of a State declining to pay a debt or to-perform an obligation, and the
party seeking to enforce its performance by judicial process.
Id. at 336 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
For cases which Justice Bradley felt fell into this category, see id. (listing Board of
Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203
(1872); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 164 (1812)). All but Osborn were claims involving state contracts in which recovery was allowed by the Court.
143. Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 335-36 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
144. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
145. Id. at 159-60 ("[i]f the act which the state [official] seeks to enforce be a violation of the federal Constitution . . . he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character"). For a more thorough discussion of Ex parte Young, see infra notes 238-47
and the accompanying text.
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It is said that the government does not represent the State when
it does an unconstitutional act, or passes an unconstitutional
law. . . . A State can only act by and through its constituted
authorities, and it is represented by them in all the ordinary exhibitions of sovereign power. It may act wrongly; it may act unconstitutionally; but to say that it is not the State that acts is to
make a misuse of terms, and tends to confound all just
distinctions. " "
He also observed that "regarding the individual officers as the real
parties proceeded against, and ignoring the fact that . . . the officers only represent the State [is a] technical device [that] is not
a sound or fair interpretation of the [eleventh amendment] ."""
In view of the precedent and context to this point, the Court's
decision in Hans cannot be read as interpreting the eleventh
amendment to bar contracts clause claims against the states. The
Court's view was that the contracts clause did not constitutionalize the creditors' contract rights, thus leaving those creditors with
only the duties imposed by the common law - claims that would
by all accounts be barred by common-law sovereign immunity if
they were asserted against a state. However, the Court believed
that where the scope of the contracts clause did extend to protect
citizens against state action taking away property or rights which
they had already acquired under a contract with the state, sovereign immunity would not bar a suit brought against that state
seeking judicial "means of protection and redress against unconstitutional oppression and exaction.' ' 8
Generalizing slightly, as Justice Bradley did in Marye, "some
legal means of resistance or redress" must be available
"[w]henever . . . life, liberty, or property [are] threatened, assailed or invaded by unconstitutional acts"' 149 - despite the exis-

146. Marye, 114 U.S. at 335 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 331; see also In Re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887) ("[the eleventh
amendment] must be held to cover, not only suits brought against a state by name, but
those also against its officers, agents, and representatives").
This was precisely Justice Harlan's dissenting argument in Ex parte Young. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[i]t would therefore seem clear
that within the true meaning of the Eleventh Amendment the suit brought [against the
state official] . . . was one, in legal effect, against the state . . . and therefore it was a suit
to which, under the Amendment . . . the judicial power of the United States did not and
could not extend").
148. Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 336 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
149. Id. at 335 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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tence of sovereign immunity. Thus stated, the law of the eleventh
amendment as then-understood in Hans is no different than what
it would be today if the generally accepted view of Hans were
overruled: while common law sovereign immunity would operate
to bar common law claims against a state, it cannot constitute a
bar to a federal constitutional claim against a state, whether for
injunctive relief or for damages. 150
III.

CRITICISMS OF THE NEW READING OF HANS

Some objections to this Article's new reading of Hans are implicit in Professor Field's criticism of Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Parden v. Terminal Railway.' 5' Parden outlined, but
did not develop, a view of Hans that is somewhat similar to the
new reading posited here. 52 The analysis of Hans in Justice Brennan's Parden opinion was as follows:
This case is distinctly unlike Hans . . . where the action was a
contractual one based on state bond coupons, and the plaintiff
sought to invoke the federal-question jurisdiction by alleging an
impairment of the obligation of contract. [153] Such a suit on
state debt obligations without the States's consent was precisely
the "evil" against which both the Eleventh Amendment and the
expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were directed.
Here, for the first time in this Court, a State's claim of immunity against suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a
cause of action expressly created by Congress. 5

150. See supra note 11.
151. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
152. See supra note 35 for other cases where Justice Brennan has asserted this
theory.
153. Justice Brennan further explained in a footnote that:
Of the other cases cited in which federal-question jurisdiction was asserted,
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 [(1900)], and Ex parte New York, [No. 1] 256
U.S. 490 [(1921)], were also commonplace suits in which the federal question
did not itself give rise to the alleged cause of action against the State but merely
lurked in the background. The former case was a tax-refund suit brought by
receivers of a corporation created by Congress, and the latter was an admiralty
suit for property damage due to negligence. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311,
[(1920)] was a suit against the State to restrain it from enforcing the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, on the ground that the Amendment
was invalid.
For a discussion of Smith, Ex parte New York, and Duhne, see infra notes 197-200,
188-91 and 210-12 and accompanying text.
154. Parden, 377 U.S. at 186-87 (footnote renumbered) (footnote omitted).
Parden did not involve a federal constitutional claim, but a personal injury claim
against Alabama's state railway under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Id.
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Professor Field made two objections to this analysis. Her first
objection was that Justice Brennan's suggestion "that Hans was
not a federal question case at all - is erroneous. While one might
deem suits based upon the contract[s] clause of the Constitution
to 'arise.under' state contract law rather than under the Federal
Constitution, the . . .Court has not adopted this position."1 5
Professor Field is wrong in regard to her first objection for
two reasons. First, Justice Brennan did not say that Hans was not
a federal question case; rather he said it did not involve a federal
law claim. Before the Mottley decision in 1908,156 federal question
jurisdiction existed over many cases where the plaintiff asserted
solely non-federal claims, particularly where the plaintiff pleaded
a non-federal claim and a federal rejoinder to an anticipated defense. 1 57 Professor Field's error was that she interpreted Hans and
Justice Brennan's analysis through post-Mottley eyes. Second, just
five years before Hans, the Court did adopt the position that the
rights asserted by state bondholders were "rights the plaintiff derives from the contract with the State" and were not "rights secured to him by the Constitution of the United States."' 5 8
Professor Field's second objection is more complicated. She
suggested that Justice Brennan's other basis for distinguishing
Hans - that Parden involved a clash between state sovereign immunity and a claim authorized by Congress - is fallacious (1)
because there is no reason to treat federal claims authorized by
statute any differently than those implied directly from the Constitution, and (2) because implied constitutional claims under the
contracts clause are clearly barred by the eleventh amendment.' 5 9
One can agree with the first proposition, but dispute the second.
In support of her assertion that contracts clause claims are
barred, Professor Field asserted that normally "the contract[s]

155. Field, Part II, supra note 4, at 1255 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1264
n.272 (discussing the federal judicial development of common-law sovereign immunity and
the possibility that the Constitution might freeze any development).
156. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
157. See supra notes 61-87 and accompanying text.
158. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1884) (quoted supra text accompanying note 45 and discussed in supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
Indeed, this was the unanimous view of the justices. Though Justice Bradley and three
other justices concurred in the judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, they explicitly-stated their agreement with the majority that all claims by
bondholders against state actors were "in substance and effect" suits for specific performance of the contract. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
159. Field, Part II, supra note 4, at 1256.
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clause does contemplate private enforcement suits against
states. 160 Quoting Justice Marshall, she maintained that "[t]he
only difference between the Contract[s] Clause and congressionally created causes of action is that the Contract[s] Clause is
self-enforcing, it requires no congressional act to make its guarantee enforceable in a judicial suit."'' Yet, Professor Field pointed
out, that the Court has consistently taken the position "that contract[s] clause claims can, be raised only defensively."'' 62 With this
understanding, "[t]he holding in Hans . . . can, and probably

should, be maintained; but the holding flows from the contract[s]
clause, not from the eleventh amendment." 6 However, she maintained, the reason that the contracts clause is simply a "defensive"
negative on state laws that impair contracts that does not include
an affirmative right of action, is because of state sovereign immunity. This view, she says, "best accords with the Framers'
intent." 64
An initial problem with this position is peculiar to Professor
Field as a common-law immunity theorist. Once one maintains
that a constitutional protection "normally" authorizes private
suits, but is interpreted as not doing so because of common-law
sovereign immunity, one has set up a conflict between a federal
constitutional provision and common-law sovereign immunity, and
resolved it in favor of immunity. If this is Professor Field's theory,
then either she has abandoned her view that the eleventh amendment simply resurrects common-law immunity, or she has said
that constitutional limitations are powerless to modify the common law when the two conflict.' 5

160. Id. at 1266.
161. Id. at 1257 (citation omitted) (quoting Employees of the Dept. of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 292 n.8 (1973) (Mar-

shall, J., concurring)).
162.

Field, Part II, supra note 4, at 1266.

163. Id.; see also P. Low & J.

JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 817 n.f (1987) (describing Professor Field's view as an "attempt to

rehabilitate Hans not as a construction of the [eleventh] amendment, but as a correct interpretation of the contract[s] clause").
164. Field, Part II. supra note 4, at 1266.
165. Professor Field did not make clear what the limits are to this logic. She admitted that it did not mean "that every other constitutional provision must similarly be interpreted to maintain states' immunity from suit" and that "the results reached would obtain
as a matter of interpretation of each constitutional provision, and not because the eleventh
amendment creates a bar to federal judicial recognition of private actions against states
that are implicit in constitutional guarantees." Id. at 1267-68. However, she vaguely offered that "[i]t may be that no constitutional provision, or at least none existing prior to
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Beyond that, however, there are problems with Professor
Field's assertion that there is normally an implied right of action
under the contracts clause for persons in Mr. Hans' position, because that clause is considered to be "self-enforcing." In support
of this assertion, Professor Field cited to Sturges v. Crowninshield. 6 But clearly, this is not the meaning that the Sturges
Court intended. First, Sturges involved a suit between private parties, a context in which an implied right of action directly under
the contracts clause is irrelevant. 16 7 Second, the question in
Sturges was whether states could pass bankruptcy laws which provided for the discharge of debts if Congress had not yet passed
any bankruptcy laws. While the Court admitted that states were
not preempted from passing laws concerning bankrupts in the absence of bankruptcy legislation by Congress, the contracts clause
would operate on its own to invalidate state laws that impaired the
obligation of contracts - including state bankruptcy laws providing for the discharge of obligations on antecedent debts.' 6 8 If this
is what "self-enforcing" means, it is exactly the same point made
in Carter v. Greenhow: the contracts clause operates on its own
without any assistance from Congress (other than general jurisdictional grants) to void state laws impairing contracts and that is
the full scope of its protections.6 9 But this does not change the
fact that suits brought by creditors are common law contract
claims and subject to the applicable common law limitations. It is
the limitations inherent in the common law of contract rights and
remedies that limit the relief creditors can obtain - not some sovereign immunity limitation on the scope of the contracts clause.
Thus, there are ample reasons - having nothing to do with state

the adoption of the eleventh amendment, will be interpreted to alter common law immunity
and impose suit on states of its own force." Id. at 1268.
But perhaps, she suggested, the effects of the eleventh amendment should be limited to
suits "to enforce debts against the states" under other constitutional provisions, or
"[p]ossibly . . .to any monetary liability." Id. But see Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1981)
(to limit the eleventh amendment to suits for monetary relief would ignore its explicit language); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933) ("The fact that the motive for the adoption of the [e]leventh [a]mendment was to quiet grave apprehensions that were extensively
entertained with respect to prosecution of State debts in the Federal courts cannot be regarded . . . as restricting the scope of the [a]mendment to suits to obtain money
judgments.")
166. Field, supra note 4, at 1257 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122 (1819)).
167. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
168. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 199.
169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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sovereign immunity - for the contracts clause to provide only a
"defensive" negative on state laws.170
Moreover, if the normal scope of the contracts clause is
blunted by sovereign immunity, one would expect that the Court
would have noted that fact at some point. Professor Field has offered no evidence from the history of the contracts clause or from
case law for her assertion that sovereign immunity is the reason
for the contracts clause's limited reach. Instead, she reasoned
that: (1) the question of whether states were immune from suit
was hotly debated when article III was considered; (2) had the
contracts clause allowed a court to reach the same conclusion,
surely there would have been an outcry; and (3) therefore, it is
because of state sovereign immunity that the contracts clause can
only be used "defensively" and does
not authorize an affirmative
17 1
right of action for its enforcement.
Silence is a difficult record from which to argue even in the
best of circumstances. Contrary to what Professor Field suggested,
there is a far better explanation for the framers' silence about sovereign immunity when the contracts clause was considered: they
saw no conflict between the two. Certainly, Alexander Hamilton
saw no conflict between states "surrender[ing]" their sovereign
"immunity in the plan of the convention" and their continued
"privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from
every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good
72
faith."
There are good reasons why Hamilton's colleagues similarly
would have failed to see any clash between the contracts clause
and sovereign immunity. It is doubtful that the framers would
have understood that common law sovereign immunity qualified as
a "Law" that was "pass[ed]" by a "State" that "impair[ed] the
Obligation of Contracts."'1 73 First, decisional law was not generally understood as a "Law" that was "pass[ed].' 74 Second, before
170. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
Of course, Justice Bradley's observation in Hans, and his dissent in Marye v. Parsons,

114 U.S. 325 (1885), made clear that the contracts clause's "defensive" posture allows for
affirmative suits whenever the state makes "any attempt . . . to violate property or rights
acquired under its contracts," which suits would not be barred by sovereign immunity.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20, 21 (1890) (quoted more completely supra text accompanying note 137).
171. Field, Part II, supra note 4, at 1266-67.
172. FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 107, at 529-30 (A. Hamilton).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § IV, cl. 8.
174. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924) (contracts clause ap-
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1938, general common law doctrines would not have been understood to have been "passed" by a "State" within the meaning of
the contracts clause. At the time, the common law was thought of

as having a source more transcendental than the authority of a
particular state.' 75 Third, common-law sovereign immunity would
not have been viewed as a law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The exclusive focus of the contracts clause was the prohibition of laws that retroactively changed or negated contract obli-

gations that had been assumed before the "impairing" law went
into effect. 176 Because the "impairing" effect of common law sovereign immunity would have pre-dated the formation of all relevant state contracts, and would thus operate only prospectively, it
would not offend the prohibition against retrospective alteration.

77

Certainly, no contracts clause cases before or since Hans

plies only to legislative acts); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) ("In
the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of [c]ourts
constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of
themselves laws.").
As Professor Fletcher has recently shown, despite severe criticism in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Justice Story was probably correct in his observation regarding the use of the phrase "laws of the several states" contained in the Rules of Decision Act as not including case law. See Fletcher, The General Common Law, supra note
34, at 1517-28.
175. Compare Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (representing the traditional view of the common law and holding that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction are not bound by state decisional law as opposed to legislative enactments) with Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruled Swift). See Fletcher, The General Common Law, supra note 34, at 1517-21 (the "underlying premise" in 1789 was that the general common law "was not attached to any particular sovereign"); see also Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1797) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (concluding that the law
applicable to Chisholm's claim against Georgia was the general common law as modified
by Georgia statutory law).
176. See supra note 39.
177. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 39, at 372 (pre-existing
provisions do not violate the contracts clause). Compare Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213 (1827) (prospective law constitutional) with Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (retrospective law unconstitutional).
It should be noted that, in addition to the other reasons why the framers would not
have seen the contracts clause as being in conflict with sovereign immunity, it would have
been necessary for them to have foreseen the Courts somewhat surprising holding that the
contract's clause applied to state contracts. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87,'
138-39 (1810).
Equally important, they would have needed to connect coverage of state contracts with
suing states. The Fletcher case, itself, and most of the prominent contracts clause cases
involving the validity of state contracts, were suits between private parties that did not
involve the state as a party in any way. For instance, Fletcher was a simple suit for breach
of a covenant of title between private individuals. Id. at 125-28; see also, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (contract between private parties). But
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considered the argument that common-law sovereign immunity, or
any other general common law doctrine, violated the contracts

clause. Nor is it apparent that the otherwise ingenious state bond17 8
holders ever thought of it.
To summarize, sovereign immunity operates to defeat recovery against a state on a contract claim - even one which the state
may have unconstitutionally impaired. But it does so only by mod-

ifying the common-law remedy that would normally be available
were the defendant not a state. It does not do so by limiting the
scope of the contracts clause. Sovereign immunity does not clash
with the contracts clause, and cases such as Hans merely stand

for the well-known proposition that sovereign immunity bars a
common-law claim for contract enforcement against a state unless
the state consents to suit.

see New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812) (contract between a private
party and a state).
Attorney General Randolph did presage Fletcher in his argument in Chisholm, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) at 427 (it is particularly appropriate to prohibit states from relieving their own
contractual obligations), as did Patrick Henry in the Virginia debates. See 3 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

474 (J. Elliott, ed., 2d ed. 1901) (contracts clause will apply, though inappropriately, to
states as well as to private parties).
178. There is some language in Justice Bradley's dissent in Marye v. Parsons, 114
U.S. 325 (1885), that might be taken as suggesting a conflict. Justice Bradley observed
that, in the bondholder suits, "we have one provision of the Constitution set up against the
other." Id. at 331 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Also, he noted that "If the contract[s] clause
and the Eleventh Amendment come into conflict, the latter has paramount force." Id.
(Bradley, J., dissenting). This is consistent with a common-law sovereign immunity view of
the eleventh amendment, since the common-law immunity which that amendment dictates
does have "paramount force," since it operates to defeat a common-law contract claim
regardless of any state law impairing that contract. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. Justice Bradley effectively set up the same juxtaposition in McGahey v. Virginia,
135 U.S. 662 (1890), where he maintained on the one hand "that the various acts of the
assembly of Virginia . . .imposing impediments and obstructions to [the use of state bond
coupons] do in many respects materially impair the obligation of that contract" and on the
other "that no proceedings can be instituted by any holder of said bonds or coupons against
the Commonwealth of Virginia." Id. at 684.
The portion of Justice Bradley's Marye dissent just discussed might also be taken to
imply, contrary to the thesis of this Article, that the claim and the sovereign immunity bar
were both constitutional. In addition to the point just made above, such an implication is
inconsistent with other portions of his dissent, as well as with his assertions in Hans. See
supra notes 89-150 and accompanying text. Moreover, Justice Bradley noted, consistent
with the majority holding in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885), that the claim was
"in truth and reality" one for the enforcement of contractual rights with the states. Marye,
114 U.S. at 332-33 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
IV.

[Vol. 40:931

STARE DECISIS OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW READING OF
HANS

In light of the common law nature of Hans' claim, the careful
way that Justice Bradley discussed the immunity issue - and his
express exception for constitutional claims - the Hans Court
could not have meant that all cases arising Under federal law, including federal constitutional claims, would be barred. Yet, there
are statements in the opinion that might be read that way, 1 9 and
later cases have cited Hans for this proposition. 80 A legitimate
question to ask, then, is whether a revised view of Hans really
helps that much. Specifically, the doctrine of stare decisis would
argue against even a correct reinterpretation of a case if an entire
0 8 ' An examination of
unbroken line of later cases rests upon it.

179. There are two types of statements that can be interpreted as barring even federal constitutional claims. First, there are those that suggest that all federal question cases
are barred. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (claiming that it would be an
"absurdity" to suggest that there would be no outrage if Congress had provided that the
eleventh amendment did not immunize a state from suit by its own citizens based on federal question jurisdiction). Second there are those statements to the effect that all suits by
private individuals are barred. See id. at 17 ("[i]t is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any
other, without its consent and permission") (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S.(20 How.)
527, 529 (1857)).
180. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17
(1982) (citing Hans for the proposition that the eleventh amendment has "long been held"
to apply to suits against a state by its own citizens); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 66263 (1974) (claiming that the Court has consistently held, since Hans, that a state cannot
be sued "in federal courts by her own citizens" without her consent); Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 280 (1973) (citing Hans as support for the idea that it is an "established" principle
that a state cannot be sued "in federal courts by her own citizens"); Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (citing Hans as support for the proposition that a state cannot be
sued by its own citizens even on claims arising under the federal Constitution or federal
law); Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (a state's immunity from suit
by its own citizens outweighs all of the judicial power contained in the federal Constitution
as demonstrated "by repeated decisions" of the Court, of which Hans is but one).
181. Justice Scalia made this exact point in his separate concurring and dissenting
opinion in Union Gas though his remarks were responsive to the prospect of overruling
rather than reinterpreting Hans. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 22982299 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia echoed
the same concerns raised by Justice Powell in his plurality opinion in Welch v. Texas Dept.
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), where Justice Powell warned that in
overruling Hans, "the Court would overrule at least 17 cases, in addition to Hans itself."
Id. at 494 n.27.
Justice Brennan has alluded to the irrelevancy of stare decisis when an erroneous
interpretation of the Constitution is at stake: "[w]hether the Court's departure from a
sound interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment occurred in Hans or in later cases that
misread Hans. . . is relatively unimportant." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
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cases citing Hans, however, reveals that redefining Hans at this

point would principally be an exercise in correcting dictum regardingHans, rather than overruling holdings based on it.
The stare decisis problem was discussed in Welch v. Texas
8 2 where
Department of Highways and Public Transportation,"
Justice Powell indicated concern that Hans and seventeen other
cases would have to be overruled if the course plotted by Justice

Brennan and the other opponents of Hans was followed.18 3 A close
analysis of those cases indicates that the stare decisis problems
involved with a revised reading of Hans, while serious, are 'not4
nearly as grave as they would be if the Court overruled Hans.
A.

Cases Involving Common-Law or State-Law Claims

First and foremost, Hans itself would not have to be over-

ruled. Reinterpreting rather than overruling Hans would avoid the
ultimate evil stare decisis is designed to avoid. Reinterpretation

would also advance the cause of understanding the correct nature
234, 300 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
183. Id. at 494 n.27. The seventeen cases were: Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, State of Mo., 411 U.S. 279
(1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); Exparte
New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503 (1921); Exparte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921);
Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151
(1909); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
184. Justice Powell appears to have been overinclusive. See Jackson, supra note 4, at
119-24 (discussing the cases that concerned Justice Powell from the standpoint of overruling Hans). One case can be immediately dropped from Justice Powell's list. Disturbing the
Court's holding in Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899), cannot properly be laid at the
feet of those who urge overruling - or a revised reading - of Hans. Fitts was effectively
overruled long ago in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For a discussion of Young, see
infra note 228-47 and accompanying text.
Like Young, Fitts was a suit for injunctive relief brought against the attorney general
of a state to enjoin his prosecution of the plaintiffs under a state statute alleged to violate
the Constitution. Fitts, 172 U.S. at 517. Justice Harlan, consistent with his dissent in
Young, maintained that
As a State can act only by its officers, an order restraining those officers from
taking any steps, by means of judicial proceedings, in execution of the statute
. . . [alleged to be unconstitutional], is one which restrains the State itself, and
the suit is consequently as much against the State as if the State were named as
a party defendant on the record.
Id. at 529 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:931

of claims against states on their contracts and the scope of the

contracts clause.
The principle for which Hans should stand - that common
law claims are barred by common law sovereign -immunity - is
completely consistent with several cases on Justice Powell's list.
For example, in Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company,'85 liquor
sellers, relying on diversity jurisdiction, sought to obtain money
from a state fund under the theory that the state statutes relating

to the fund created a contract in their favor.' 86 Despite the plaintiffs' attempts to introduce constitutional issues into the case, the
Court believed that
the bills of complaint sought to compel the State to specifically
perform alleged contracts with the vendors of liquor by paying
for liquor alleged to have been supplied. But it is settled that a
bill in equity to compel the specific performance of a contract
between individuals and a State cannot, against the objection of
the State, be maintained in a court of the United States.18
Likewise, Ex Parte New York, No. 1,18 8 and Ex parte New

York, No. 2,189 involved admiralty claims which the Court held
were barred by the eleventh amendment -

even though the text

90
of that amendment applied only to a suit "in law or equity."1

However, this was the proper resolution, because admiralty claims

were general common-law claims, which would thus call for the
application of common-law immunity.'

185.
186.

213 U.S. 151 (1909).
Id. at 163.

187. Id. at 168 (citing Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886)).
The plaintiffs argued that the state's action, which terminated a fund from which
liquor sellers previously could claim payment, was a violation of the contracts clause. Although they also argued that this action violated the equal protection and due process
clauses, the Court used Hagood to dispose of the case. Murray, 213 U.S. at 168. This is
significant because in Hagood, the plaintiffs' claims were described as bills for specific
performance of a contract with the state and were dismissed on state law grounds. Hagood,
117 U.S. at 67.
188. 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (an admiralty suit cannot be maintained against a
state under the eleventh amendment).
189. 256 U.S. 503, 510 (1921) (admiralty suit against the state barred).
190.

Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. at 497.

191. Today, one thinks of the common law of admiralty as federal common law;
however, in 1921 (and in 1890), admiralty law would have been simply another branch of
the general common law. See Fletcher, The General Common Law, supra note 34, at 1531

(under the lex loci principle, federal admiralty courts relied on local law whenever available); see also Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at 1082 (in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, admiralty law was not considered state or federal - but
the law of nations).
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Similarly explainable is Missouri v. Fiske.19 2 Fiske was a suit

by an heir, based on diversity jurisdiction, seeking to quiet and
otherwise secure his remainder interest in an estate over which the

federal court had asserted jurisdiction in rem.'"3 When the state
of Missouri intervened to claim estate taxes due on stock alleged
to be part of the estate, the heir brought an ancillary and supple-

mental bill seeking to protect the property by enjoining the state
from prosecuting its claim in the state probate court. 9 Likewise,
the injunctive claim against the state was properly barred since it
was simply a common-law claim to preserve the res.9 5

The eleventh amendment cases after Hans involving state law
claims can be synthesized with the new reading of Hans.
Whatever the scope of the common-law sovereign immunity secured by the eleventh amendment is, that immunity must encompass a state's right to insulate itself from liability if that liability
results from law of its own creation. 196
For example, Smith v. Reeves'9 7 sustained an eleventh
amendment defense; however, like Hans, it was a case that arose

under federal law, but presented solely non-federal claims. 98
Though there was federal question jurisdiction based on the fact
that the plaintiffs were the receivers of a federally chartered railroad, their claim was simply that the state taxing authorities had

192. 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id. at 24.
195. It might be argued that Fiske involved a federal issue: the res judicata effect of
the federal court's prior judgment with regard to the property. In dismissing the claim
against the state, the Court noted that the plaintiff had the remedy of raising his contentions in state court, with later review by the Supreme Court of the United States if needed.
Id. at 29; see also Jackson, supra note 4, at 122 n.482 ("federal question concerning res
judicata effect of prior federal judgment could be raised in state court"). However, it is
unlikely that this would turn the plaintiff's claim into a federal law claim. A suit on a
federal judgment in federal court was not considered to raise a federal question. See Metcalf ,. Waterton, 128 U.S. 586 (1888) (discussed supra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text). Moreover, the source of the law of res judicata would have been considered - at
least in 1933 - to be the general common law. See supra note 34 (discussing Swift and
Erie).
196. As Justice Holmes observed in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349
(1907), "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Id. at 353. See Fletcher, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 4, at 1069-70 &
n.157 (legal scholars have agreed for four hundred years that a sovereign may not be sued
under its own laws without its consent).
197. 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
198. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.

980
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erroneously charged them taxes on rolling stock owned by a different railroad. 199 The Court sustained the state's claim of sovereign
immunity against that claim based on its own law.200 Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman201 also involved a claim
based solely on state law, which the Court held was barred by the
eleventh amendment.20 2 And in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,0 3 counties sued by an Indian tribe filed an indemnity claim against the state. The Court held that the claim was

barred by reason of the eleventh amendment (as construed in Pennhurst): the Court found "that the counties' cross-claim for indemnity by the State [based on ancillary jurisdiction] raises a
'204
question of state law.
B.

Cases Involving Federal-Law Claims

Turning to the more problematic cases involving federal
claims, there were relatively few of them until recent times. From
1890 until the current generation of eleventh amendment cases
began in 1973,205 the Court sustained an eleventh amendment de-

fense in the face of a federal constitutional claim only three times:
in Duhne v. New Jersey,2 0° in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Read,2 07 and in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury. °8
During that same period, there was not a single case where the
Court held that the eleventh amendment barred a claim seeking to
enforce federal statutory rights.2 09
In Duhne v. New Jersey,2 10 New Jersey residents sought leave

199. See Smith v. Rackliffe, 87 F. 964, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1898), aff'd sub nom.,
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
200. Reeves, 178 U.S. at 448-49.
201. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
202. Id. at 117.
203. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
204. Id. at 252.
205. This most recent line of eleventh amendment cases began with Employees of
the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411
U.S. 279 (1973).
206. 251 U.S. 311 (1920).
207. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
208. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
209. The first suit against a state on federal stattitory grounds was heard by the
Court in 1964. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) ("[here, for the
first time in this Court, a State's claim of immunity . . . meets a suit brought upon a cause
of action expressly created by Congress"). The Court refused to allow the immunity claim
to prevail. Id. at 198.
210. 251 U.S. 311 (1920).
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to file an original action in the Supreme Court of the United
States seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution on the ground that it was
illegally ratified."' The precise theory of the petitioners' claim
was not clearly set out in the two-page memorandum opinion denying leave to file the case as an original action. The opinion was
cryptic and cited Hans perfunctorily for the proposition that article III "does not embrace the authority to entertain a suit brought
by a citizen against his own State."2'12
In Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read" 3 and in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,"4 the plaintiffs sued in federal
court for a refund of taxes allegedly collected in violation of the
Constitution. 1 5 The Court found that the suits were against the
states - even though individual defendants were named. 1 ' Consequently, the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred
those suits, and it even cited Hans for the proposition that the
eleventh amendment was a constitutional right enabling states to
bar all suits brought against them by private parties without their
21 7

consent.

Neither Duhne, Great Northern, nor Ford Motor Co., focused on the argument that federal constitutional claims should be

treated differently than common or state law claims, nor did any

211.

Id. at 312-13.

212. Id. at 313.
213. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
214. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
215. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 460-61 (alleging that the tax collections violated
article 1, section 8, and the fourteenth amendment); Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 49
(claiming that the taxes violated the fourteenth amendment).
216. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463-64; Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 51-53;
cf. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (eleventh amendment does not bar suits against
state officials.
A large part of the reason why the suits were deemed to be against the state was
because the plaintiffs relied for their causes of action solely upon state statutes providing
for refunds, and these statutes authorized suits only against the state itself. These state
statutes did not constitute a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity, however, since they
limited the forum for such suits to the state courts only. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 46566; Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 55.
217. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464 (eleventh amendment is an "express constitutional limitation [that] denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit brought by
private parties against a state without its consent") (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890)); Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 51 ("A state's freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment . .

.

. [It) prevents ac-

tions against a state by its own citizens without its consent.") (citing Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
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of them explicitly say that Hans disposed of that argument. Thus,
it seems that there is room to argue that these cases could be rein-

terpreted rather than directly overruled.
One basis for reinterpreting Duhne has been offered by Professor Jackson. She has suggested that Duhne, as a suit by private
persons against a state, should have been dismissed as not properly within the Court's original jurisdiction over cases in which the
state is a party.2 18 Also, dealing as it did with the issue of whether
the eighteenth amendment had properly become part of the Con-

stitution, Duhne probably should have been dismissed on political
question grounds.21 9
Both Great Northern and Ford Motor Co. can be viewed as
cases where there was an independent state law ground for deci-

sion. The Court explicitly found that the plaintiffs in each case
had relied exclusively on state statutes authorizing an action for a
refund of "illegal" taxes in state court and that jurisdiction over
the claims authorized by those statutes was legislatively limited
solely to the state courts. 22 0 Furthermore, the Great Northern
Court cited Smith v. Reeves for the proposition that "an act of a

state is valid which limits to its own courts suits against it to recover taxes.

2 21 The

dismissals in Great Northern and Ford Motor

Co. were, therefore, correct because the plaintiffs lacked a valid
source in state law for their claims in federal court. Thus, the
Court's holdings in these cases should not be taken as specifically
excluding the possibility that, had the plaintiffs not relied on the

state statutory cause of action, but asserted a claim directly under
the fourteenth amendment or the commerce clause, they would

have survived dismissal 222
amendment immunity.

despite the states' claims of eleventh

218. Jackson, supra note 4, at 123.
Moreover, since the petitioners sought only prospective injunctive relief, it would seem
that the only other impediment to their suit was the gross pleading error of naming the
state as defendant instead of its officials.
219. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (refusing on political question
grounds to decide whether the Child Labor Amendment was properly ratified by the Kansas legislature).
220. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 465-66; Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 53-55.
This, the Court held, showed that their suits must have been against the state itself
since that was all the state statute allowed. See supra note 216.
221. Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 55 (citing Reeves, 178 U.S. 445); see supra text
'accompanying notes 197-200 for a discussion of the Reeves opinion.
222. Moreover, one might argue that the state statutes were forum allocation devices
that should have mandated dismissal of the federal claims involving state taxes. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 120-22 (explaining that Ford Motor Co. and Great Northern could
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If these reinterpretations of Duhne, Great Northern and Ford

Motor Co., are not accepted, no other alternative would exist but
to overrule them. The same would be true of the post-1973 cases

relying on the Court's erroneous view of Hans, as expressed in
Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v.
Department of Public Health and Welfare.2 23
Federal claim cases that have restated the broad view of
Hans in dictum, but have nonetheless held that the requested re-

lief was not barred, are not as problematic from a stare decisis
standpoint, because their holdings are correct.2 2" However, the officer-suit cases, as exemplified by Ex parte Young, are of at least

have been dismissed, wholly apart from sovereign immunity, on the grounds of the federal
judicial policy to avoid state tax disputes where the state provides its own adjudicative
mechanism); see also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100
(1981) (holding that the principle of comity prevents a claim asserting the unconstitutional
administration of a state tax system from being brought in federal court where the state
courts provide an adequate remedy).
223. 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973).
The Employees Court cited Hans, Duhne and Parden for the proposition that "it is
established that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by
her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Id. at 280.
The following post-1973 cases would require overruling due to their reliance on Hans:
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2307, 2401 n.2 (1989) (declining to overrule Hans and
finding that the eleventh amendment bars federal statutory claims); Welch v. Texas Dep't
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) "the Eleventh Amendment bars
a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen's own state in federal court"); Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (citing Hans in support of the proposition that "this
Court long ago held that the [eleventh] Amendment bars suits against a State by citizens
of the same State as well"); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (stating that
"States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms,"
while upholding dismissal of a suit against the Director of the Michigan Department of
Social Services for alleged violations of provisions of the Federal Aid to Fariiilies with
Dependent Children program); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238
(1985) ("the [eleventh] Amendment bar[s] a citizen from bringing a suit against his own
state in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment do not so provide"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (reaffirming prior decisions holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate state immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 66263 (1974) (citing Employees to support the claim that "[the] Court has consistently held
that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another State.").
To disclose any possible source of bias, I should say that I was lead counsel for the
petitioners (the plaintiffs below) in Green.
224. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (holding that
claims against a state under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act are not barred in federal court). It can be argued that Union Gas and
other cases upholding statutory claims on the ground that Congress has abrogated eleventh
amendment immunity make more sense under the theory argued here, i.e. if the immunity
involved is seen as only a common law one. This was Justice Stevens' basis for concurring
in Union Gas. Id. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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passing concern, because the officer-suit fiction is so well-established and could be read as implicitly giving credence to a broad
reading of Hans.225
C. Some Surprising Lessons from the Officer-Suit Cases
The reason for concern over cases typified by Ex parte Young
is that the officer-suit fiction is necessary only if it is assumed that
eleventh amendment immunity would otherwise prevent the constitutional claims made in those cases from being brought in federal. court. Yet, there is evidence that the Court, even while it was
engaged in the process of establishing the officer-suit fiction for
federal constitutional claims, recognized that the question of
whether constitutional claims were barred at all was still an open
one. In the early officer-suits, the Court considered the officer-suit
fiction to be a more conservative, alternative solution; it was only
later that the Court came to assume that this alternative solution
was the only possible solution. It is this sub silentio shift from
alternative to sole solution - and not Hans itself - that is
largely responsible for the Court's statements in the officer-suit
cases that the eleventh amendment bars "even federal claims that
otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 22 Since this shift was accomplished without any meaningful consideration of the more direct route suggested by Justice
Bradley in Hans,227 it is appropriate that the Court now reconsider whether that shift was correct.
In Pennoyer v. McConnaughy,228 an officer suit decided a
year after Hans, the Court explicitly recognized the viability of
the more direct route originally plotted by Justice Bradley in
Hans and arguably applied it. In Pennoyer, McConnaughy had
acquired land from the state of Oregon under a contract of sale
225. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
One could argue that the results of the officer-suit
cases make much more sense under
the theory argued here than under the rationale offered*in the officer-suit cases themselves.Young holds that the official acting contrary to federal law is not acting for the state and is
therefore subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. Id. at 160.
Yet that conduct is nonetheless state action, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278 (1913), and it is the state itself, not the individual official who must comply
with the federal court's judgment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974). There
is no doubt that Young- type officer suits are in reality suits against the state itself.
226. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984) (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
227. See supra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
228. 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
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which the state subsequently attempted to reclaim.229 Justice Lamar wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that
McConnaughy's claim against Oregon's governor and other high
state officials was not barred by the eleventh amendment. 3 In
many respects, Pennoyer seems to be a direct application of Hans
as reinterpreted here. McConnaughy's claim certainly resembled
the kind of "defensive" true constitutional contracts clause claim
that should not be barred which Justice Bradley had excepted
from the purview of the holding in Hans in the penultimate paragraph quoted earlier.23 ' Indeed, Justice Lamar quoted that entire
paragraph as a prelude to his holding. 232 He then noted that,
though McConnaughy's suit named various state officers as defendants, "this suit is not nominally against the governor, secretary of state, and treasurer, as such officers," but against them collectively, as the board of land commissioners." 23' Justice Lamar
nonetheless concluded that the eleventh amendment was not a bar
to McConnaughy's suit because his suit sought to enjoin acts "alleged to be unconstitutional, which acts will be destructive of his
rights and privileges, and will work irreparable damage and mischief to his property rights. 234
Of course, if Justice Lamar had correctly understood Justice
Bradley's exception for true constitutional claims, and McConnaughy's claim came within it, there was no need to go beyond the
above framework. But he did go further in an attempt to synthesize the meandering line of eleventh amendment cases involving
suits against state officers that sought to determine which officer
suits were in reality suits against a state and which were not.235
Justice Lamar's conclusion that McConnaughy's suit against the

229. Id. at 4-6 (statement of the case).
230. Id. at 25.
231. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890) (quoted and discussed supra
text accompanying note 138).
232. Pennoyer, 140 U.S. at 18 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21).
233. Id. at 18; see also supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 334 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (suing state officers
was tantamount to suing the state); cf.Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (t908) (holding that

offending officials are not the state) (discussed infra notes 229-48 and accompanying text).
234. Pennoyer, 140 U.S. at 18.
235. See Pennoyer, 140 U.S. at 17.
The perilous nature of this course is shown by the fact that no one else has ever been
able to synthesize these cases and come up with any consistent rule. See C. JACOBS, supra

note 4, at 189 n.22 (no persuasive reconciliation can be made); see also McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 685 (1890) (advocating a case-by-case adjudication).
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state officers was not one against the state 3 6 would seem to con-

tradict the finding that the suit was against the state board itself.
This suggests that perhaps Justice Lamar intended his officer-suit

analysis to be an alternative basis for holding that the eleventh
37
amendment did not bar the suit.
Justice Lamar's alternative officer-suit suggestion was acted

upon in Ex parte Young,2 38 which relied on Pennoyer and shared
several characteristics with it. Young is perhaps the most prominent eleventh amendment case decided after Hans and it is known
for establishing the fiction that federal constitutional claims
against state officers in their official capacities are not barred by
the eleventh amendment, because a suit against a state officer acting contrary to the Constitution is not a suit against the state.2 3
However, a closer reading of Young indicates that the Court rec-

ognized that the eleventh amendment might well not bar constitutional claims against the state ifself, but that the Court chose to
dispose of the case on the more narrow officer-suit grounds.2 40

236. Pennoyer, 140 U.S. at 18-19.
237. Justice Lamar's officer-suit distinction to some extent restated Justice Bradley's
distinction between common-law claims to enforce contracts and true constitutional claims.
Justice Lamar described the two categories of officer-suits as follows:
The first class is where suit is brought against the officers of the State, as
representing the State's action and liability, thus making it, though not a party
to the record, the real party against which the judgment will so operate as to
compel it to specifically perform its contracts.
The other class is where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming
to act as officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute,
commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State.
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (citations omitted); see also Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890) (a state cannot be compelled to perform a contract but it can be
prohibited from interfering with another's contractual rights), quoted in Pennoyer, 140
U.S. at 17-18.
238. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
239. Id. at 159-61.
In Young, the federal court had enjoined Young, the Minnesota Attorney General,
from prosecuting railroad employees for rate regulation violations in state court on the
ground that the state regulatory statute violated the due process clause. Young sued for
habeas corpus after being held in contempt and jailed for violating the federal court's
injunction. The issue in the Supreme Court of the United States was the validity of the
federal court's injunction in light of the state's claim of eleventh amendment immunity. Id.
at 127-34.
240. Young was decided almost twenty years after Hans and it is entirely possible
that as with the modern eleventh amendment cases, the Court in Young had forgotten the
original rationale of the Hans opinion. In the intervening years there were substantial
changes on the Court, including the death of Justice Bradley in 1892. Of the eight justices
who signed Justice Bradley's Hans opinion, only three remained on the Court at the time
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The Court in Young did not disclose its reason for resorting

to the officer-suit fiction. However, it stands to reason that, even if
Hans did not hold that a constitutional claim would be barred,

and' further implied in dictum that it would not,24 ' the Court
nonetheless would not wish to rush in at the earliest opportunity to
turn that dictum into holding. It is more likely that the Court
would have preferred to dispose of the specific officer suits that
came before it without taking any unnecessary steps.242 This
would be especially true given the political sensitivity of the issue
at that time: "[a]s the federal courts became entangled at the turn
of the century in the contentious issues of business regulation of
the time, the idea kept recurring that this was not a fitting tribunal for the decision of such questions. 243

of Young. See G. GUNTHER, CASES

AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, App. A-3A-5 (10th ed. 1980).
241. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
242. There are numerous examples of the Court taking this approach - especially in
the eleventh amendment area. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290-91 (1977)
(resolving the case on Young grounds while reserving the question whether the fourteenth
amendment overrides the eleventh amendment); see also, e.g.; Welch v. Texas State Dep't
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987) (assuming that Congress has
the power to abrogate the eleventh amendment under its commerce clause power); County
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nition, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985) (same); cf. Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (assuming without
deciding that there is an implied right of action under the fourteenth amendment that
would allow suits against "non-person" school boards that are not part of the state for
eleventh amendment purposes despite § 1983 limiting suits to ones against "person"
defendants).

243.

HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

45 (2d

ed. 1973).
In this respect, the Court seems to have moved from one political frying pan into
another. By the time of Young, the Court had just barely extricated itself from the state
bond cases and their accompanying threat of open defiance by Southern states should the
Court issue any decision upholding the claims of the state bondholders. See supra note 36.
In Young and other cases like it, federal district judges had been issuing both preliminary
and final injunctions against state regulations, based on the due process clause. E.g., Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). These injunctions crippled state efforts to regulate
business, especially regulation of rates charged by monopolistic railroads.
The reaction to the Court's holding in Young was serious enough that Congress passed
a statute two years later depriving federal trial judges of the very power exercised and
confirmed by the Court in Young- the power to enjoin the operation of state statutes of
statewide applicability on grounds of their unconstitutionality. See Act of June 18, 1910,
ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982)). The
Act provided that only a specially-constituted three-judge federal court could enter such
relief. See id. § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557. It provided for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Id. This statute survived in this basic form until 1976 when it was
amended to apply only to legislative apportionment cases and when required by acts of
Congress. See Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
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The alternative device to which the Court resorted was well
known in English law: a suit could not be brought against the

King, but one could sue an officer if that officer exceeded his powers or defaulted in his official duties.2 4 More relevant than this
distant pedigree was the fact that by 1908, it was well-established
that the eleventh amendment did not protect state officers from
suit for acts, under color of their offices, that were tortious under
the common law or violated state law.2 45 If the Court applied this

well-established fiction to the federal law claims in Young, and
suits like it, the Court could maintain that it was doing nothing
special for federal constitutional claims against state officers,
treating them neither better nor worse than claims based on the
state's own law that might be brought against them. Thus, the
Court could avoid taking a step that would have placed federal

law claims in a special, more favorable category. It would be a
much less radical position to hold that claims against state officers
were no less barred because the illegality that pierced the officer's

normal sovereign
proportions.

immunity

defense was

of constitutional

§ 2284 (1982)).
244. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 338, 33965 (J.O. Andrews 4th ed. 1899); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-39 (1963).
245. See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883) (if a
suit can be maintained in state court to protect property rights invaded by unauthorized
acts of state officers, a citizen of another state may invoke federal jurisdiction on that type
of claim); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (citing Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883)); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270
(1885) (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883)).
Indeed, such state and common-law suits continued to be exceptions to eleventh
amendment immunity until 1984. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment bars state law claims even if asserted only
against state officers when the state is the real or substantial party in interest). But see
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Reagan, 154 U.S. at 390-91;
Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 287; Cunningham, 109 U.S. at 452) (arguing that no basis exists
for the majority's assertion that the issue was open, since the court had consistently held
that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit federal courts from issuing injunctive relief
against state officials to remedy violations of state law).
The same rule had also been adopted for suits against officers of the United States.
See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896) (sovereign immunity of the United States does
not protect its officers from liability in a tort action by a private plaintiff whose property
rights have been wrongfully invaded); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893) (where an
individual is sued in tort for an act that injured the plaintiff, the defense that the individual
acted pursuant to orders of the United States is no bar to jurisdiction); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (doctrine that the United States cannot be sued has no applicability when officers or agents of the same are sued for misuse of private property).
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The Young opinion shows how the Court expressly acknowledged the possibility of the broader holding suggested in Hans,
but chose to take the safer route. The Court juxtaposed the eleventh amendment and the fourteenth amendment, quoting one and
then the other. It then observed:
We think that whatever the rights of complainants may be, they
are largely founded upon [the fourteenth] Amendment, but a
decision of this case does not require an examination or decision of the question whether [the fourteenth amendment's]
adoption in any way altered or limited the effect of the earlier
[eleventh] Amendment. We may assume that each exists in full
force, and that we must give to the Eleventh Amendment all the
effect it naturally would have, without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant.24
Thus assuming the eleventh amendment's application to fourteenth amendment claims, the Court found adequate ground for
avoiding its effect in the specific case presented - a suit against a
state officer - using the traditional exception.24
The Court's conservative approach in Young worked out so
well that it was not until the modern round of federal claims,

246. Young, 209 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added).
247. The way the Court resolved the conflict in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S.
211 (1908), provides an insight into the viability of a different holding in Young. In General Oil Co., the oil company sued in state court for an injunction against a Tennessee
official charged with collecting a state tax on oil, which the oil company claimed violated
the commerce clause. Id. at 212 (statement of the case). Though the trial court enjoined
part of the tax, the Sulfreme Court of Tennessee reversed on the ground that, regardless of
the merits of this constitutional claim, Tennessee statutes prohibited its courts from entering injunctions against state officials. Id. at 216 (statement of the case). Consequently, the
Supreme Court of the United States had to face and resolve the conflict between the assertion of a federal constitutional claim and the state's immunity. The Court had no trouble
disposing of the state's claim that its officers were immune under state law, observing that
"[n]ecessarily to give protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws, as determining the character of the suits against state
officers. And the suit at bar illustrates the necessity." Id. at 226. Otherwise, "it must be
evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the
Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be
nullified as to much of its operation." Id.
There is one puzzling aspect of General Oil Co.: an introductory phrase to the second
sentence quoted above stated that preventing assertion of a fourteenth amendment claim in
state court would be intolerable because "a suit against state officers is precluded in the
national courts by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. This reason for the Court's holding is a
little hard to understand since the Court had just held the same day in Young that suits
against state officers were not precluded in the federal courts. See Young, 209 U.S. at 59-

61.
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starting in 1973, that the Court was faced with the full implications of the conflict between federal law claims and the commonlaw sovereign immunity preserved by the eleventh amendment.

When it was, the Court decided the modern question in favor of
sovereign immunity. And by misconstruing Hans, the Court lost

the opportunity for a different solution. Though the true significance of Hans was buried very deep, and Young came to be understood as the only way to enforce federal claims against states,
vestiges of Young's "stop-gap" status have remained. The Court
today, even while continuing to misread Hans, has continued to
describe the question of whether the fourteenth amendment pro
tanto overrules the eleventh amendment as one that it has not yet

decided and has reserved for another day. 48
D.

Reliance Interests of Congress

In addition to stare decisis concerns encompassing

the

Court's reliance on a broad reading of Hans, Congress' possible
reliance interests should be considered. In explaining his reluctant
agreement with the members of the Court who believed that Hans
should not be overruled, Justice Scalia recently observed that
Hans has had a pervasive effect upon statutory law, automatically assuring that private damages actions created by federal
law do not extend against the States. Forty-nine Congresses
since Hans have legislated under that assurance. It is impossible
to say how many extant statutes would have included an explicit
preclusion of suits against States if it had not been thought that
such suits were automatically barred. 4 9

However, Congress' reliance should not give the Court pause
248. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 n.23 (1977) (after deciding
against the state's claim of eleventh amendment immunity on Young grounds, the Court
indicated that it does not reach the question of whether "the fourteenth amendment, ex
proprio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of the eleventh amendment").
249. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2298 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia stated that "it is not even possible to say that, without Hans, all constitutional amendments would have taken the form they did." Id. He suggested, for example,
that the seventeenth amendment, which eliminated the election of senators by state legislators, could well have been affected by Hans. Id. There is absolutely no evidence that Hans
had any effect in one way or the other on the ratification of the seventeenth amendment.
This is especially so since only five years earlier in Young, the Court considered it an open
issue whether the eleventh amendment was overruled by the fourteenth amendment. Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) (Court merely assumed that both amendments
were in force).
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in reinterpreting Hans. There are two kinds of legislation affecting
states that might have been affected by Congress' reliance on
Hans: (1) statutes creating new statutory liabilities against states,
and (2) statutes facilitating suits against states to protect rights
secured by existing statutes or the Constitution.
In the first category, one would expect that, if Hans was such
a source of comfort for members of Congress, some of its members would have mentioned it or the eleventh amendment when
debating legislation creating new statutory liabilities. However,
there is no evidence of Congress citing or discussing it. Whatever
Congress might have thought that Hans meant, assuming it was
familiar with Hans at all, that knowledge did not stop Congress
from imposing -

or the Court from approving -

numerous fed-

eral statutory liabilities against states since Hans.2 50 Moreover,
any claim of congressional reliance is undercut by the fact that it
was not until 1964 that the Court even suggested Hans meant
that there might be eleventh amendment problems with any of
those statutes; 251 and it was not until 1973 - eighty-three years
after Hans was decided - that the Court applied Hans to limit
the reach of a federal statutory claim against a state.252 Given this
record, any reliance interests Congress might have had before the
Court's latter-day revelations about the meaning of Hans for statutory claims would seem to point in precisely the opposite
direction.
If anything, it is the Court's recent imposition of a clearstatement requirement upon Congress that has undercut these
longstanding -and precisely opposite - reliance interests. This is
so because the Court has imposed the clear-statement rule retro-

250. In determining that Alabama was a "common carrier by railroad" within the
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Court announced that it would find a
state to be in a generic statutory category "in the absence of express provision to the contrary." Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964); see also Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm., 359 U.S. 275, 282 (1959) (state is "employer" covered by Jones
Act); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 554 (1957) (states included in Railway Labor
Act); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) (Federal Appliance Safety Act
applies to $tates); cf. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S.
150, 156 (1983) (Alabama is a "person" suable under the Robinson-Patman Act).
251. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (potential eleventh amendment problem noted, but amendment held inapplicable on theory that the state consented
to suit by operating subject to congressional regulation); supra text accompanying note
154.
252. Employees of the Dep't of Health and Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health
and Pub. Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1973) (Fair Labor Standards Act does not abrogate state immunity).
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holding Congress' legislation to a standard of clarity

that did not exist when the legislation was passed. Indeed that
retroactive standard becomes more stringent each time the Court
addresses the issue. 53
The second area where Congress legislates vis-a-vis the states
supplying federal statutory authority to protect existing statu-

tory or constitutional rights

-

has a similarly short and newly-

discovered history as far as eleventh amendment problems are

concerned. It was only recently that there has been any reason for
Congress to think that a statutory cause of action was necessary

for a person to obtain redress for state action in violation of his or
her constitutional rights. Before the Court's 1961 revival of sec-

tion 1983 civil rights actions,254 what little constitutional litigation
there was managed quite well without the statutory remedy.255
Moreover, Congress has had fewer occasions to rely on Hans since

its efforts in this second category are largely confined to one statute: section 1983.25

253. Compare Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (FELA suits are not barred against states
because they come within the definition of "common carrier") with Welch v. Texas Dep't
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (Jones Act suits and FELA suits
are barred; overruling Parden) and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 (1976) (adding
states to definition of "person" in Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is sufficient to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity under that act) with Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (it is not sufficient that Congress made states proper
defendant "recipient[s] of Federal assistance" in a federal statute; Congress must clearly
express an intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity as well) and Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 698-99 n.31 (1978) (clear legislative intent to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity is sufficient - even without clear statutory language that includes states) with
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401 (1989) (legislative intent is insufficient for abrogation without unequivocal textual expression.
254. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (plaintiffs stated a cause of
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) even though actions of defendants violated
state law).
255. By contrast, the idea that the mere existence of a constitutional right carried
with it the authority to obtain relief in court was the means by which judicial remedies
were made available. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 163 (1803) ("it is
a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded") (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23); see also Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (discussing cases approving and applying Court-created constitutional remedies).
The premier model for constitutional claims against state actors - Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) - succeeded without any need for section 1983.
256. For one of the few statutes other than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that fits in this category, see Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (1982), construed in
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (Congress intended that equal protection
claims to special education be brought under this Act rather than § 1983).

1989-90]

TAMING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

993

It is difficult to see how there has been any reliance interest
with regard to the passing of section 1983. Whether section 1983
is considered as a vehicle for redressing violations of constitutional
or statutory rights, Congress cannot be said to have relied on

Hans in passing it, since Congress enacted it almost twenty years
before Hans was decided.251 Moreover, section 1983 has a legislative history replete with much anti-state rhetoric, 2 58 and the debates on section 1983 are devoid of any mention of the eleventh

amendment. 59 If Congress had thought about, or researched, the
eleventh amendment, it is likely that it would have discovered
60
Chief Justice Marshall's statements in Cohens v. Virginia,1
where he stated that the eleventh amendment did not apply at all
to federal question cases.2 61 These statements were not contra-

257. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
258. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 355-65 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting examples an anti-state sentiment from the legislative history of section 1983).
259. The Court has viewed Congress' failure to mention the eleventh amendment as
indicating that Congress must have assumed that many of the claims it had authorized by
section 1983 would be barred by the eleventh amendment. Quern, 440 U.S. at 343 (concluding that the silence on the eleventh amendment is itself a significant indication of legislative intent)..
There are also more neutral explanations. Congress may have been silent on the subject because other parts of the bill were more controversial. Other provisions of the same
bill (which passed) included such invasions of state sovereignty as military takeovers of
state and local governments and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for persons
arrested by federal agents. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§
3-4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15. By contrast, section 1, the section that became section 1983, was
described as "so very simple" because it was "really rednacting the Constitution." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (1871) (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (floor manager of
the bill who stated his supposition that no one would oppose the portion of the bill that
became § 1983). It is significant that the Civil Rights Act was reenacting provisions of the
Constitution that stated "[n]o State shall" violate the rights set out in the fourteenth
amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
260. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
261. Chief Justice Marshall rejected any notion that states would be immune in federal question cases, because
From this general grant of [federal question] jurisdiction, no exception is
made of those cases in which a state may be a party. When we consider the
situation of the government of the Union and of a state, in relation to each
other; the nature of our constitution; the subordination of the State governments
to that constitution; the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided to the judicial department; are we at liberty to insert in this general grant, an exception of
those cases in which a state may be a party? Will the spirit of the constitution
justify this attempt to control its words? We think it will not. We think a case
arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognisable in the
courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case.
Id. at 382-83.
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dicted by the Court until nearly seventy years later in Hans.2 62
Before Hans, no legal scholars approached such a broad reading
of eleventh amendment immunity.26 3 Since section 1983 is the pri-

mary vehicle for the vindication of federal constitutional and statutord rights against state action, and since it was passed well
before Hans, it is difficult to see how Congress could have relied

on a broad reading of the eleventh amendment as set forth in
64
2

Hans.

CONCLUSION

Hans v. Louisiana has been roundly criticized for holding

He also stated that:
If this writ of error be a suit, in the sense of the [eleventh] amendment, it is not
a suit commenced or prosecuted 'by a citizen of another state, or by a citizen or
subject of any foreign state.' It is not, then, within the amendment, but is governed entirely by the constitution as originally framed, and we have already
seen, that in its origin, the judicial power was extended to all cases arising under
the constitution or laws of the United States, without respect to parties.
Id. at 412.
262. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1890).
The Court in Hans believed that it should disregard the statement as dictum, since
Chief Justice Marshall also justified the Cohens holding on the ground that a writ of error
on appeal was not a suit against a state. Id.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Court
had similarly observed that the eleventh amendment "has its full effect, if the Constitution
be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court never been
extended to suits brought against a [s]tate, by the citizens of another [s]tate, or by aliens."
Id. at 857-58.
263. For instance, Justice Story's famous treatise on the Constitution simply cited
Osborn, quoted supra note 261, to explain the import of the eleventh amendment. See J.
STORY, supra note 129, at 462. Moreover, Judge Conkling, in his widely respected treatise
on federal courts, observed that the eleventh amendment applied to suits against a state by
citizens of another state, but that "if the case arises under the Constitution ... or if it is
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, it matters not who may be the parties." A. CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1864); see also B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 14, 18 (1880) (articulating
Conkling's understanding of the eleventh amendment).
Most importantly, none of these sources suggested that there might be some broad
constitutional immunity that states enjoyed which would defeat even federal constitutional
claims against them.
264. 1 am aware that the Court has recently construed section 1983 based on the
contrary assumption - that Congress believed that states would be immune from the constitutional claims authorized to be brought under its provisions. See Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). If the Court either overrules or reinterprets Hans,
Will would have to be reconsidered.
To disclose any possible source of bias in the matter, I should disclose that I was lead
counsel in and argued the Will case.
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that the eleventh amendment bars suits by citizens against their
own state, including federal constitutional claims, despite its more
narrow wording limiting its sweep to suits against states by citizens of other states. This interpretation of the eleventh amendment conflicts with the command of the fourteenth amendment
that states respect the rights of their citizens. The Court has reacted to this conflict between immunity and accountability by creating fictions instead of considering whether Hans should be
overruled.
There are stare decisis considerations that militate against
overruling a one-hundred-year-old precedent - even if it is wrong
and the Court has so far responded to those concerns by declining to overrule Hans. However, there is another way to avoid the
impact that Hans has had on federal law claims without overruling it. Even a cursory reading of Hans reveals that it did not specifically consider and hold that federal law claims were barred by
the eleventh amendment. A closer reading of Hans in its proper
historical context reveals that the claim involved in that case was
not a federal constitutional claim, but a common law claim to enforce a contract, to which the Court quite properly applied another common law doctrine -

state sovereign immunity -

to bar

it. Moreover, the Court in Hans opined in dictum that, had a constitutional claim been presented, neither the eleventh amendment
nor state sovereign immunity would have barred it. So understood,
Hans does not stand for the proposition that the eleventh amendment bars federal law claims, and the Court should promptly reconsider that question and hold that it does not.

